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ARTICLES
FLORIDA'S OMNIBUS AIDS ACT OF 1988t
ROBERT CRAIG WATERS
In response to the growing fears and sometimes irrational attitudes
associated with the deadly disease AIDS, the 1988 Florida
Legislature passed the Omnibus AIDS Act, affecting twelve
substantive areas of law. In this Article, the author examines each of
these areas, suggests the most likely interpretation the courts will
accord the new provisions, and makes recommendations to correct
oversights and inconsistencies in existing laws.
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FLORIDA'S OMNIBUS AIDS ACT OF 1988t
ROBERT CRAIG WATERS*
"[The AIDS epidemic carries the potential to be the greatest natural
tragedy in human history"'
N 1988 the Florida Legislature faced a grim fact: Florida never has
experienced a force as potentially devastating2 as the deadly and
t © 1989 by Robert Craig Waters. All rights reserved.
* Judicial Assistant to Rosemary Barkett, Justice, The Supreme Court of Florida; A.B.,
Brown University; J.D., 1986, University of Florida. Mr. Waters, a former journalist in the
Tallahassee Capitol press corps, is the author of the practice manual, R.C. WATERS, AIDS AND
FLORIDA LAW (D & S Publishers) (forthcoming, 1989).
The author extends special thanks to: the Justices of The Supreme Court of Florida, and
especially Justice Barkett, for their permission to publish this Article; Representative Lois Fran-
kel and Senator William "Doc" Myers for providing access to source material; Tom Cooper of
the House Health Care Committee staff, Phil Williams of the Senate Health & Rehabilitative
Services staff, and Michael B. Edmonson of Representative Frankel's staff, for invaluable help
in compiling legislative history; Jonathan Klein of the Florida Task Force and Lobbyist Charlene
Carres for assistance in obtaining other legislative history; Florida Supreme Court Librarian
Brian Policy and his staff, Joan Cannon, Jo Dowling and Jo Smyly, for their help in obtaining
resource material; Professor William McHugh of Florida State University College of Law for
sharing his insights into federal legislation; Karen Hastings of the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services for her assistance in obtaining information on the history of AIDS in
Florida; and Cynthia Fuller of the Florida Department of Insurance for assistance in interpreting
the insurance provisions of the Omnibus AIDS Act.
The views expressed in this Article are entirely those of the author and do not reflect the
views of any other individual or institution.
This Article is dedicated to the 3,649 Floridians who had died of AIDS by the time this
Article was completed.
1. W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, CRisIs: HETEROSEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AGE
OF AIDS 11 (1988) (emphasis added) [hereinafter MASTERS & JOHNSON].
2. Florida currently ranks third highest in the cumulative numbers of deaths caused by
AIDS. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07 (1988) Staff Analysis 1
(Apr. 13, 1988) (on file with committee) [hereinafter Health Care Analysis]. This ranking en-
compasses all AIDS cases reported since June 1981. New York and California ranked first and
second, respectively, on April 25, 1988, in terms of cumulative AIDS-related deaths. CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, AIDS WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, Apr. 25, 1988, at 2 (copy on file,
Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter CDC REPORT]. However, California, New
York, and New Jersey rank first through third, respectively, in terms of active AIDS cases, with
Florida ranking fourth. Id. Every American state reports active AIDS cases. Id. Some medical
researchers now contend that AIDS is a far more serious health threat than earlier reports sug-
gested. They estimate that by the year 2000, unless a vaccine or other effective therapy is devel-
oped, there will be a cumulative total of five million full-blown cases of AIDS in the United
States alone, with a worldwide total of 25 million. MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 15.
Even by 1991, Masters and Johnson estimate that a staggering 500,000 cases of AIDS in the
United States with more than 300,000 deaths attributed to the disease. Id.
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incurable viral disease, AIDS.' The Legislature conservatively esti-
mated that 210,0001 Floridians-almost two percent of the popula-
tion-were infected with the causative agent, human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV),5 by early 1988. Moreover, the number
of full-blown AIDS cases is expected to increase almost 800% by 1991
to a total of 32,000.6 At least one legislator predicts that as many as
200,000 Floridians will die of AIDS-related illnesses within eight
years, requiring an annual state appropriation of up to a billion dol-
lars by the 1990s.
7
There is little doubt that people are frightened. 8 Fear of the dis-
ease in Florida already has promoted ill-conceived
3. "AIDS" means acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, a complex of diseases and infec-
tions generally believed to be caused by infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
See MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 179-84. A minority of researchers contend that AIDS
either is not caused by HIV or that HIV is only a cofactor. See Campbell, Medical Aspects of
AIDS-Related Litigation, in AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL GUIDE 11-9
n. 12 (1988). This possibility, however, has been rejected by the National Academy of Sciences.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, at 2 (1988) [hereinafter
AIDS UPDATE 1988). The Reagan administration's Presidential Commission on the Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus Epidemic has argued that the term "AIDS" is obsolete and should be
replaced with the term "HIV infection." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMAISSION ON THE Hu-
MAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY Vmus EPIDEMIC xvii (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION RE-
PORT]. Because of the legal distinctions involved, this Article will use the term "AIDS" to mean
the syndrome of diseases classified as "full-blown AIDS" by the Centers for Disease Control;
"AIDS-related complex" or "ARC" to mean HIV infection accompanied by illness attributable
to the virus but technically not qualifying as AIDS; and "HIV infection" to mean asymptomatic
infection with HIV. See id. at 8.
4. At least one legislator argued that the figure more realistically is about 400,000 Floridi-
ans currently infected with HIV. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 19
(Apr. 13, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep.
Frederick Lippman, Dem., Hollywood).
5. HIV, the biological agent responsible for AIDS, is synonymous with lymphadenopathy-
associated virus (LAV) and human T-cell lymphotropic virus type three (HTLV-III), both earlier
names given to it by researchers. Campbell, supra note 3, at 11-9 n.12. The term HIV has been
adopted by the Centers for Disease Control upon recommendation of the Assistant Secretary for
Health, Department of Health & Human Services. HIV Infection Codes, 36 CENTERS FOR DIS-
EASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT S-7, at 1-S (Supp. Dec. 25, 1987)
[hereinafter Infection Codes].
6. Health Care Analysis, supra note 2, at 1. The cost of caring for each AIDS patient is
estimated at between $50,000 and $150,000. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of
hearing at 3 (Apr. 13, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments
of Rep. Frankel).
7. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of proceedings at 19-20 (Apr. 13, 1988)
(transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Lippman); id. at 10-
11 (May 11, 1988) (comments of Rep. Lippman). The Legislature also estimated that one of nine
men and one of 75 women in Florida between the ages of 30 and 39 currently are infected with
HIV. Id., transcript of proceeding at 2-3 (Apr. 13, 1988) (comments of Rep. Lois Frankel,
Dem., West Palm Beach).
8. See Eisenberg, The Genesis of Fear: AIDS and the Public's Response to Science, 14
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 243, 245 (1986).
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quarantines9 and violence against HIV-infected schoolchildren.10 AIDS-
induced discrimination threatens to force thousands of people onto the
public dole as employment, health services, insurance and housing are
denied them." The judicial system itself has strained to respond to an
onrush of new AIDS-related issues, often with ill-suited legal doctrines
and precedents. Foreseeing chaos and hysteria, 2 the Legislature resolved
in 1988 to address the full range of legal issues raised by the unparalleled
tragedy now beginning to unfold in Florida. 3 What emerged from the
1988 Regular Session was a sweeping reform contained in the Omnibus
AIDS Act of 1988 (Omnibus AIDS Act). 4 This broad series of
9. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 519 So. 2d 1156, 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (local judge
reversed for ordering HIV-infected grand-theft defendant to serve additional 24 months under
community control "to protect the public from the spread of the disease"); Quarantine Indica-
tion of 'Hysteria', Pensacola News J., June 12, 1987, at IA, col. 2 (detailing quarantine of a 14-
year-old in a county mental health hospital). The Pensacola quarantine itself was sternly criti-
cized by state officials. See infra notes 334, 336 and accompanying text.
10. Rays Giving Up, Leaving Town, Sarasota Herald Tribune, Aug. 30, 1987, at IA, col. 5
(detailing arsonists' attack on home of HIV-infected schoolchildren). See Ray v. School Dist.,
666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (lawsuit involving same children). The incident involving the
Ray children in Arcadia, Florida, was cited as one of the reasons why new AIDS-related legisla-
tion was needed. See Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 4 (Apr. 13,
1988) (copy on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel). A num-
ber of authors have addressed the legal problems of HIV-infected schoolchildren. See generally
Rothstein, Children with AIDS: A Need for a Clear Policy and Procedure for Public Education,
12 NOVA L. REV. 1259 (1988); Schwarz & Schaffer, AIDS in the Classroom, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
163 (1985); Comment, Enforcing the Right to a Public Education for Children Afflicted with
AIDS, 36 EMORY L.J. 603 (1987); Comment, Protecting Children with AIDS Against Arbitrary
Exclusion From School, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (1986); Comment, AIDS: Do Children with
AIDS Have a Right to Attend School?, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1041 (1986).
11. See South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985), approved, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987) ("AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can lead to dis-
crimination in employment, education, housing and even medical treatment."); Fla. H.R.,
Comm. on Health Care, transcript of proceeding at 61 (Apr. 28, 1988) (transcript on file, Flori-
da State University Law Review) (comments of Gary Clarke of HRS) (at Miami's Jackson Me-
morial Hospital, 60% of costs generated by AIDS patients were paid from state tax revenues or
local property taxes because patients had no insurance or were indigent); PRESIDENTIAL COMMIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 3, at xviii ("Fear has led to discrimination against persons known to be
infected.").
12. The hysteria and misinformation about AIDS have permeated American society, fed by
an unfounded fear that the disease may be contracted even through casual contact. See Freed-
man, Wrong Without Remedy, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 36, 37-40. Evangelist Moody Adams
contends that the United States itself may be destroyed by AIDS and other diseases, which he
believes are the product of immorality and sin. M. ADAMS, AIDS: You JUST THINK YOU'RE SAFE
23-27 (1986).
13. The 1988 Legislature did not attempt to address the problem of future appropriations
necessary to deal with the geometric increase in AIDS cases expected over the next few years.
Under the 1988 legislation, the problem of future appropriation will be studied, and reports will
be made to future Legislatures. See infra note 490 and accompanying text.
14. Ch. 88-380, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996 (codified at scattered sections of FLA. STAT. (Supp.
1988)). The Omnibus AIDS Act was not provided an official name in the legislation itself. Com-
mittee Substitute for House Bill 1519 (Second Engrossed) (approved July 6, 1988) is the bill that
became chapter 88-380.
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enactments will touch virtually every area of legal practice and will
push the state into the forefront of jurisdictions responding compre-
hensively to the threat posed by HIV.Y5 One legislator, openly worry-
ing about the public hysteria over AIDS, indicated that the Omnibus
AIDS Act brings to Florida an abrupt philosophic change meant to
prepare the state for the tens of thousands of deaths expected from
HIV infection in the 1990s.16 This ominous prediction is fully consis-
tent with the forecast that up to 500,000 deaths will occur nationwide
in four years.'
7
In preparation for this disaster, the Omnibus AIDS Act and related
legislation revise and supplement no less than twelve major substan-
tive areas of Florida law, by: (1) outlawing certain forms of discrimi-
nation against people believed to be HIV infected and by creating new
causes of action to enforce these rights; 8 (2) declaring that HIV-re-
lated information about prior occupants is not a material fact in real
estate transactions; 9 (3) placing new limits on the use of HIV-related
information in insurance underwriting; 20 (4) providing new procedures
for isolating individuals suspected of contributing to the spread of
HIV;2 ' (5) creating new criminal sanctions for those who knowingly
pass HIV to others;22 (6) laying down new legal standards for AIDS
15. For an overview of how states have responded to AIDS, see generally INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, AIDS: A PUBLIC
HEALTH CHALLENGE (1987) (3 vols.); The Shaping of AIDS Law, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 1,
col. 1.
16. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 19 (Apr. 13, 1988) (tran-
script on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Lippman).
17. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at xvii.
18. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (Supp.
1988)).
19. Id. § 46, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2031 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 689.25 (Supp. 1988)).
20. Id. § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2031-34 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429 (Supp. 1988)); id.
§ 48, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2034-35 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.41 l(f) (Supp. 1988)); id. § 49, 1988
Fla. Laws at 2035 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.6265 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 50 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 627.6646 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 51, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2035-37 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
641.3007 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 52, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2037-38 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
641.3 1(b)(6) (Supp. 1988)).
21. Id. § 29, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2017-18 (amending FLA. STAT. § 384.27 (1987)); id. § 30,
1988 Fla. Laws at 2018-19 (amending FLA. STAT. § 384.28 (1987)); id. § 31, 1988 Fla. Laws at
2019-21 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.281 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 32, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2021 (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 384.282 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 33 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.283 (Supp.
1988)); id. § 34 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.284 (Supp. 1988)); id.§ 35, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2021-
22 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.285 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 36, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2022 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 384.286 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 37, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2022-23 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
384.288 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 38, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2023 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.34 (Supp.
1988)).
22. Id. § 27, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2016 (amending FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1987)); id. § 44, 1988
Fla. Laws at 2028-29 (amending FLA. STAT. § 796.08 (1987)).
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testing, counseling and confidentiality; 23 (7) providing new standards
for HIV-related drugs, home tests, and therapies; 24 (8) setting new
guidelines for dealing with AIDS in the state's prisons and jails; 2 (9)
creating a massive statewide educational program; 26 (10) establishing
new standards for donating human blood and tissue;2" (11) providing
for new epidemiological research and planning;28 and (12) coordinat-
ing local patient-care delivery systems.
29
This Article examines how the 1988 AIDS legislation will affect
each of these areas and in what ways it departs from preexisting law.
It draws extensively from transcripts of legislative hearings and de-
bates to determine actual legislative intent. Using settled rules of stat-
utory construction as its framework for analysis, 0 the Article suggests
the most likely interpretation that courts will accord the major com-
23. Id. § 21, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2008-13 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609 (Supp. 1988)).
24. See infra notes 433-40 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 441-52 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 453-62 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 463-84 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 485-90 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 491-504 and accompanying text.
30. This Article rests on several premises that will be used as a framework for analysis.
These premises generally deal with (1) the methods of determining actual legislative intent behind
a statute, where it exists, and (2) the methods of construing a new statute in the absence of any
clear intent. Initially, this Article will presume, as do the courts, that clear statements of legisla-
tive intent must serve as the "pole star" of construction. See, e.g., Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d
161 (Fla. 1987); Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. 1981). To this end, the
language of the new statutes will be examined to determine if intent is stated clearly. If so, this
intent will be considered definitive. See S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d
687, 689 (Fla. 1978). But where the statutory language is ambiguous or contradictory, the author
will draw extensively from transcripts of committee and floor debates in which provisions of the
bills were discussed, as well as relevant staff documents. If clear statements of intent exist in
these sources, they will be considered definitive, with greatest weight given to statements of
chairmen of the committees responsible for drafting the language in question. See Duplex Print-
ing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 467 (1921) (statements of chairmen of committee draft-
ing bill treated as supplemental records).
Where the intent cannot be determined from any source or is unclear, this Article will employ
the general rules of statutory construction accepted by the Florida courts. It will presume, first,
that general public policy or purpose evident upon the face of the statutes or other sources will
serve as the guide of statutory construction in the absence of any express intent. Weiss v. Leon-
ardy, 160 Fla. 570, 36 So. 2d 184 (1948); In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So. 2d 840 (1947);
Scarborough v. Newsome, 150 Fla. 220, 7 So. 2d 321 (1942).
Second, where a new statute is inconsistent with another statute, a construction will be fa-
vored that gives effect to both as much as possible in light of the overall intent or policy ex-
pressed by the Legislature. State v. Brown, 530 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 1988); Carawan v. State, 515
So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987); Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 1981). However,
where one of the inconsistent statutes is general and the other is specific, the latter will be con-
strued as an exception to the former. Adams v. Culver, I I l So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959).
Third, where two statutes address the same or a similar concern, they will be read in pari
materia to harmonize them with the central expression of legislative policy. O'Donovan v. Wilk-
ins, 24 Fla. 281, 4 So. 789, 793 (1888); Heirs of Bryan v. Dennis, 4 Fla. 445 (1852).
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ponents of Florida's new AIDS legislation. Also it discusses oversights
and errors in the Omnibus AIDS Act and suggests how they might be
corrected.
I. THE NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
Without a doubt, the most far-reaching sections of the Omnibus
AIDS Act are those dealing with nondiscrimination.' As signed by the
Governor, the Omnibus AIDS Act had two significant effects in this
area. First, it left undisturbed Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office
of Budget and Management Policy,32 which forbids AIDS-related dis-
crimination in the workplace, despite some limited efforts to overrule
that decision legislatively during the 1988 session.33 Second, the Omni-
bus AIDS Act added five major new AIDS-related civil rights provi-
sions to state law, along with general provisions providing for their
enforcement. These five new laws, read in tandem with Shuttleworth,
may prove to be the most extensive civil rights protections yet pro-
vided by a state to people with HIV-related infections.
A. HIV Nondiscrimination Before the Omnibus AIDS Act:
Shuttleworth
Prior to the 1988 legislative session, the entire body of Florida law
governing discrimination based specifically on HIV infection consisted
of Shuttleworth. In that decision the Florida Commission on Human
Relations (Commission), relying on the Florida Human Rights Act of
1977 (Human Rights Act),3 4 held that full-blown AIDS is a handicap
31. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029-31 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (Supp.
1988)).
32. FCHR No. 85-0624 (Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations, Dec. 11, 1985). A copy of this
unpublished decision is reproduced as an Appendix to this Article. The decision, and an investi-
gative report that accompanied it, are on file at the Florida Commission on Human Relations in
Tallahassee, Florida. See also Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (federal lawsuit involving same issues).
33. See Fla. H.R., transcript of proceedings at 2-5 (May 11, 1988) (transcript on file, Flor-
ida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Tom Woodruff, Repub., St. Petersburg,
1976-1988, in floor debate).
34. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-.10 (1987). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
(b) To limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties, or adversely affect any individual's status as an employee, because of such indivi-
dual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap or marital status.
Id. § 760.10(1). The statute applies to any employer having 15 or more workers during 20 or
more weeks during the current or preceding calendar year. Id. § 760.02(b).
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under state law. 5 The Commission then ruled that the Broward
County Office of Budget and Management Policy failed to give a le-
gally sufficient excuse for dismissing a worker, Todd Shuttleworth,
after learning that he suffered from full-blown AIDS. The employer
had argued that dismissal was proper because of uncertainty -over
whether Shuttleworth's employment might cause harm to others or
himself. Relying partly on analogous federal case law, the Commis-
sion ruled that the employer had not established that freedom from
AIDS was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).3 6
The question Shuttleworth did not answer, however, was whether
anything less than full-blown AIDS could constitute a handicap in
Florida: (1) AIDS-Related Complex (ARC); (2) symptomless HIV-in-
fection;3 7 (3) the mere perception or belief that a person has HIV in-
fection; and (4) the preemptive dismissal of a worker believed to be
susceptible to AIDS or HIV infection. Since Shuttleworth, neither the
Commission nor the Florida courts have had occasion to publish an
opinion addressing these concerns.
1. Defining "'Handicap" Under Shuttleworth
The answer depends significantly on the working definition of
"handicap" set forth in Shuttleworth, which is a simple one derived
from Webster's Third International Dictionary:38 "Handicap" con-
notes a condition that prevents normal functioning in some way: "A
person with a handicap does not enjoy, in some manner, the full and
normal use of his sensory, mental or physical faculties. ' 39 The Com-
35. Commentators generally have found this result in harmony both with federal law and
the law of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 21-36 (1985) (discussing approaches in various jurisdictions, under various
laws); Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 425, 445-48
(1986) (discussing Virginia law). See generally Carey & Arthur, The Developing Law on AIDS in
the Workplace, 46 MD. L. REV. 284 (1987).
36. Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget & Management Policy, FCHR No.
85-0624, slip op. at 5-6 (Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations, Dec. 11, 1985).
37. The Presidential Commission contends that both ARC and asymptomatic HIV infection
should be regarded as the same disease as AIDS, and that it is misleading to think of HIV
infection only in terms of full-fledged AIDS. PRESmENTIL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at
xvii.
38. The precise definition is "a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult;
esp.: a physical disability that limits the capacity to work." WEBSTER'S TImD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1027 (1961).
39. Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget & Management Policy, FCHR No.
85-0624, slip op. at 2 (Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations, Dec. 11, 1985) (quoting Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash.
2d 802, 809, 557 P.2d 307, 310 (1976)). Accord Lanham v. Seamless Hosp. Prod., 8 Fla. Admin.
L. Rep. 4703, 4709 (1986).
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mission has insisted upon this definition as "a meaning in accordance
with common usage." 4 It simultaneously has eschewed attempts to
import into the meaning of "handicap" precise definitions and nu-
ances found in analogous state or federal law, 41 such as the detailed
definition in the Florida Fair Housing Act (Fair Housing Act)42 or the
one used in the federal Rehabilitation Act.43 Since the term "handi-
cap" is undefined in the Human Rights Act, the Commission has left
itself considerable leeway to develop its own common law definition.
Nor has any Florida court had cause to review the Commission's ac-
tions in this regard.
The broad definition in Shuttleworth leaves open what action the
Commission is likely to take in cases involving less than full-blown
AIDS. However, there are hints as to what the results might be. In
deciding Shuttleworth, the Commission expressly relied on court deci-
sions from other jurisdictions involving similar statutes that had failed
to define the term "handicap."
One of these decisions, 44 Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Rela-
tions,45 held that a congenital disease, asthma, can constitute a handi-
cap because it can "make achievement unusually difficult.
'46
Moreover, it relied on an analogous state statute defining a "handi-
capped person" as one suffering any "physical or mental defect or
infirmity whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury or dis-
ease." ' 47 The Wisconsin court thus extended its definition beyond con-
genital diseases to include diseases that are acquired.
Despite the Commission's heavy reliance on dictionary definitions
and common usage, it has followed the Wisconsin court's lead by
drawing from more elaborate definitions of "handicap" found else-
where in the law. For instance, Shuttleworth itself cited the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Arline v. School Board,48 which
held that tuberculosis infection was a handicap under the federal Re-
habilitation Act.49 In Arline, which was affirmed on review by the
40. Lanhain, 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 4705.
41. Id.
42. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(5),(1987).
43. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(7)(b) (West Supp. 1987).
44. The other two are Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Washington State
Human Rights Conim'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976), and State v. Turner, 3 Ohio
App. 2d 5, 209 N.E.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1965).
45. 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
46. Id. at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446.
47. Id. (citing Wis. STAT. § 55.01(3)(a) (1973)).
48. 772 F.2d 759 (l1lth Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
49. Id. at 764.
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United States Supreme Court,5 0 the Eleventh Circuit held that a
"handicap" is any "physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits ... major life activities," and thus includes acquired dis-
eases. 5 Moreover, the circuit court in Arline concluded that
"handicap" includes any record of such an impairment and the per-
ception of such an impairment.1
2
Shuttleworth's partial reliance on Arline strongly suggests that the
Commission is amenable to considering by way of analogy the defini-
tion of "handicap" found elsewhere in the law. Although the Com-
mission has rejected every attempt to read other statutory definitions
directly into the Human Rights Act, 3 it has not blinded itself to those
other definitions.
Thus, the Commission may be willing to consider as relevant au-
thority part of the definition of handicap found in the Fair Housing
Act. There, "handicap" means "[a] person has a physical impairment
which subsequentially limits one or more major life activities, or he
has a record of having, or is regarded as having, such physical impair-
ment."5 4 A second provision provides that mental retardation also is a
handicap. Since this definition closely tracks the language of Arline,
it harmonizes with the Commission's reliance on the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's opinion. It is conceivable that the Commission will continue at
least to measure its "common usage" definition of "handicap"
against the language employed both in Arline and the Fair Housing
Act.
Another factor suggesting this result is that the Fair Housing Act is
related in purpose to the Human Rights Act. Both address the same
concern-discrimination based on handicap. Thus it is likely that the
Commission and a reviewing court will read the Human Rights Act in
pari materia with the Fair Housing Act, despite the fact that the for-
mer preceded the latter in time. Accepted rules of statutory construc-
tion support this conclusion.
For instance, the Florida courts consistently have held that statutes
relating to the same or a similar purpose should be construed in har-
mony even though not enacted at the same time.5 6 This especially is
50. School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
51. Id. at 1126-32.
52. Id. at 1126-27. See generally Wasson, Aids Discrimination under Federal, State and
Local Law After Arline, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 221 (1987).
53. E.g., Lanham v. Seamless Hosp. Prod., 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4703, 4705-06 (1986).
54. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(5)(a) (1987).
55. Id. § 760.22(5)(b).
56. Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1981); Sanders v. State, 46 So. 2d 491
(Fla. 1950); O'Donovan v. Wilkins, 24 Fla. 281, 4 So. 789 (1888); Heirs of Bryan v. Dennis, 4
Fla. 445 (1852).
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true where, as here, an understanding of one may help to interpret the
other,57 and the two statutes are part of a system of related provisions
expressing a single central legislative policy." Since both the Human
Rights Act and Fair Housing Act are designed to prevent discrimina-
tion against the handicapped, it is reasonable to construe the meaning
of the term "handicap" so that a similar result is achieved under both
acts. The ambiguity created when the Human Rights Act failed to de-
fine "handicap" should be resolved consistent with the definition
plainly expressed in the subsequent enactment of the Fair Housing
Act.5 9
The broad interpretation of "handicap" is underscored by the
statement of purpose contained in the Human Rights Act where the
Legislature stated that the Human Rights Act was to be liberally
construed 6° "to secure for all individuals within the state freedom
from discrimination because of . . . handicap . .. and thereby make
available to the state their full productive capacities." 61 The evil to be
remedied by the Human Rights Act is any discrimination resulting
from otherwise capable workers being denied the opportunity to be
productive. 62 This policy applies with obvious vigor to the huge num-
ber of able-bodied people in Florida who are infected with HIV.
2. Extending "Handicap" to Other HIV-Related
Discrimination
The discussion thus far suggests that under Florida law prior to the
Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988, the term "handicap" should be broadly
construed in the context of HIV-related discrimination. The next
problem is to explore the breadth of this construction. Applying
"handicap" to HIV-related discrimination is difficult because of the
unique problems associated with HIV. Physically, HIV may be mani-
fested in various ways which the scientific world is struggling to un-
derstand. Emotionally, the lack of scientific understanding has led to
the spread of fear throughout society, which itself has created prob-
lems of discrimination. Thus, we need to determine whether "handi-
57. Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1958).
58. Stewart v. Mack, 66 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1953); Paggett v. Thompson, 158 Fla. 138, 27 So.
2d 909 (1946); State ex rel. Jacksonville Gas Co. v. Lewis, 125 Fla. 816, 170 So. 306 (1936);
Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 118 Fla. 526, 160 So. 22 (1935).
59. See Doggett v. Walter, 15 Fla. 355 (1875).
60. FLA. STAT. § 760.01(3) (1987).
61. Id. § 760.01(2).
62. This generally is the same conclusion reached by the Presidential Commission that stud-
ied the HIV epidemic. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 119-20.
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cap" applies to these various physical and emotional manifestations
of HIV-related discrimination.
(a) People with ARC
The analysis outlined above suggests that the Commission could
have concluded that ARC was a "handicap" under the Shuttleworth
definition. ARC consists of a debilitating complex of illnesses not ac-
tually resulting in the many opportunistic infections that characterize
full-blown AIDS. Symptoms include uncontrollable weight loss, night
sweats, and a general wasting of the body. 63 Death frequently results,
even in cases that never convert to full-blown AIDS. 64
Even under the more restrictive view of the Shuttleworth definition,
a person with ARC still "does not enjoy, in some manner, the full
and normal use of his sensory, mental or physical faculties." ' 65 There-
fore it seems that a person with ARC is handicapped within the mean-
ing of Shuttleworth and is entitled to all the protections of the Human
Rights Act as it existed before 1988. This conclusion is underscored by
the recent expansion of the Centers for Disease Control's "Case Defi-
nition" of AIDS to include many symptoms and illnesses previously
categorized as ARC, provided that the patient also tests consistently
positive for the HIV antibody. 66
(b) Asymptomatic HIV Infection
Whether asymptomatic HIV infection falls within the Shuttleworth
definition is less clear. As is now generally known, a person may be
infected with HIV for many years without suffering any symptoms.
Such a person presently may not have a less than normal use of sen-
sory, mental and physical faculties.
Nevertheless, the authority upon which Shuttleworth relied, and the
express policy of the Human Rights Act, strongly suggest that HIV
infection itself constitutes a handicap. 67 HIV infection means that a
person in question is highly likely to die prematurely, perhaps within
only a few years. In this sense, HIV infection is no different than the
63. MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 39.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
66. Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome, 36 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT IS, 4S-5S
(Supp. Aug. 14, 1987) [hereinafter CDC Case Definition].
67. This conclusion is supported by similar analyses of the analogous Rehabilitation Act.
See Note, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS Virus as a Handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1988).
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early stages of cancer or any other terminal illness that at first causes
no untoward symptoms. Knowledge of impending premature death
alone certainly could constitute a significant loss of one's normal
physical and mental faculties.
Moreover, as the Wisconsin court suggested, a handicap can be any
acquired disease that makes achievement unusually difficult or other-
wise interferes with normal functioning. 61 Imminent death signifi-
cantly limits achievement and normal functioning. Moreover, people
known to be infected with HIV frequently have suffered severe ostra-
cism and discrimination. The result is no less disastrous than if im-
posed upon a person suffering from any other disease, such as
tuberculosis. Drawing from the analysis in Arline, the Commission
might conclude that HIV infection alone constitutes a handicap be-
cause of the effect this knowledge has on others.
By the same token, the law itself imposes significant limitations
upon people with communicable diseases. For example, prior to the
1988 legislation, it was a crime in Florida for an HIV-infected person
who knew of his or her status to have sex with another person, includ-
ing a spouse, without first informing that person of the presence of
the disease. 69 No similar restrictions are applied to uninfected people,
except to the limited extent that the sexual battery, 70 unnatural acts,71
adultery72 or cohabitation7 3 statutes dictate. Likewise, the presence of
a communicable disease, including AIDS or ARC, must be reported
to state officials. 74 Even prior to the 1988 legislation, the state had the
authority to seize the person in question, force that person to undergo
testing or treatment, and isolate him or her upon proper court order . 7
These legal and social disabilities illustrate how a person infected
with HIV suffers from a limitation upon normal physical functioning.
Thus, it seems likely that even a restrictive interpretation of the Shut-
tleworth definition of "handicap," prior to the 1988 legislation, in-
cluded asymptomatic HIV infection. This conclusion also is supported
by drawing an analogy from the definition included in the Fair Hous-
ing Act, which states that a handicap is any "physical impairment
68. This also is the dictionary definition. See supra note 38.
69. See FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1987). Indeed, any caring person who knew he or she was HIV
infected voluntarily must restrict sexual activities to prevent the infection of others.
70. See FLA. STAT. §§ 794.011-.05 (1987).
71. Id. § 800.02.
72. Id. § 798.01.
73. Id. § 798.02.
74. Id. § 384.25.
75. Id. §§ 384.27-.28.
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which substantially limits one or more major life activities. ' 7 6 HIV
infection, which limits life itself, meets this test.
(c) Perception of HIV Infection
More troublesome is the question of whether a person is "handi-
capped" if others merely perceive him or her to be HIV infected when
in fact this information is not true. At first blush, the literal definition
of "handicap" in Shuttleworth implies that the impairment constitut-
ing a handicap must be actual. That is, it must have a measurable
physical manifestation, as ARC and HIV infection clearly do. If this
is the proper interpretation of Shuttleworth, then a perception of HIV
infection standing alone would not be a handicap.
However, an analysis of this kind views the issue of handicap en-
tirely from the standpoint of the person suffering discrimination. This
is not necessarily the proper analysis, as the United States Supreme
Court suggested in School Board v. Arline.77 The Human Rights Act
itself forbids "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... handicap.
'78
Strictly read, this language does not require that the purported handi-
cap be actual-only that it be the reason for the discrimination. That
is, the employer need only believe it to be true. If sufficient proof
exists to show that the discriminatory act occurred because of an al-
leged handicap, it may be irrelevant whether the handicap actually ex-
isted.
One purpose of the Human Rights Act is to outlaw discriminatory
acts that occur because of certain kinds of information. 79 The evil to
be remedied consists of the use of this information to make employ-
ment decisions, resulting in a needless loss of "productive capacities"
explicitly protected by the Human Rights Act.S° Requiring that the in-
formation be true effectively excuses discrimination because the em-
ployer was in error, while proscribing it when the employer was not.
This approach could lead to absurd results. For instance, if an em-
ployer believed a worker was Jewish and fired him or her wholly on
that basis, it would seem utterly contrary to the purposes of the
76. Id. § 760.22(5)(a).
77. 107 S. Ct. 1130 (1987). The Court noted that the analogous federal Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 prohibited discrimination "on the basis of mythology" about any perceived handicap. It
further suggested that the effect of a perceived impairment on others is as relevant to the deter-
mination of handicap as the physical effects of an impairment on the individual in question. Id.
at 1129 n.10.
78. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1)(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
79. See id. § 760.01.
80. Id. § 760.01(2).
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religious nondiscrimination laws8 to permit the dismissal simply be-
cause the worker was Catholic and the employer was wrong. The fir-
ing was not caused any less because of religion and does not result in
any less of a loss of productive capacity.
By the same token, allowing an employer to discriminate based on
the perception of HIV infection is no less "because of ...
handicap ' 8 2 if the infection is nonexistent. The employer still has used
information-however erroneous it may be-in a way the Legislature
has forbidden, resulting in a needless loss of the worker's productive
capacity. Under this analysis the question of handicap must be viewed
through the employer's eyes. If the employer acts upon information as
though it were true, the employer has violated the intent of the Hu-
man Rights Act. Similarly, if the Commission considered by analogy
the definition contained in the Fair Housing Act, it likely would con-
clude that a person "regarded as having"83 a physical impairment is
handicapped .84
Nevertheless, the Commission has strongly suggested that it will not
consider itself bound by any definition other than the one derived
from "common usage." Despite the arguments to the contrary, it is
uncertain whether the Commission prior to 1988 would have ruled
that the perception of HIV infection standing alone constitutes a
handicap under Shuttleworth.
(d) The Possibility of Future HIV Infection
The most troublesome question prior to passage of the 1988 legisla-
tion was whether an employer lawfully could discriminate based on
the possibility of future HIV infection or disease. In most instances
this would involve actions against people thought to be in a high risk
group, such as people married to spouses with AIDS.
If the Commission were to rule that the perception of HIV infection
does not meet the Shuttleworth definition, then the perception that
one may become infected in the future cannot also be a handicap.
However, if the perception of present infection is construed to be a
handicap, the Commission for practical reasons might extend Shuttle-
worth to forbid preemptive discrimination, too. Otherwise, employers
easily could mask discriminatory motives by saying they did not be-
lieve a particular employee was HIV infected, but only that such in-
81. The Human Rights Act also forbids discrimination "because of . . . religion." Id. §
760. 10(l)(a).
82. Id. § 760. 10(1)(a).
83. Id. § 760.22(5)(a).
84. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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fection was likely to occur later. Discrimination of this type is no less
"because of ... handicap" simply because the handicap is viewed as
imminent and not current.
The long latency period of HIV-extending an average of four-and
a-half-years 85-also favors this conclusion. A belief that a person may
discover HIV infection in the future is little more than saying he or
she may be HIV infected now.
However, it is unclear whether Shuttleworth would have led to such
a result since discrimination based on perception does not clearly fall
within the Shuttleworth definition of "handicap." The question re-
maining is whether the Omnibus AIDS Act has removed these uncer-
tainties.
B. The Omnibus AIDS Act: Codifying and Supplementing
Shuttleworth
One of the most significant aspects of the Omnibus AIDS Act was
something it did not do: change Shuttleworth. Although legislative si-
lence on this subject is susceptible of many interpretations, the legisla-
tive history of the Omnibus AIDS Act indicates that the Legislature
made a conscious decision not to alter Shuttleworth, and in fact sup-
plemented it with an entire new body of related civil rights provisions.
It is apparent that the 1988 Legislature imbued state law with two new
AIDS-related policies, in light of which Shuttleworth must now be
read. These policies and the totality of Florida's AIDS-specific dis-
crimination laws almost certainly will have a sweep far broader than
that implied by Shuttleworth alone.
From the beginning, Shuttleworth figured prominently in the evolu-
tion of the Omnibus AIDS Act during the 1988 legislative session.
Representative Lois Frankel, 86 Chairwoman of the House Task Force
on AIDS, made Shuttleworth the starting point of the initial House
nondiscrimination provisions of which her task force was the primary
author. With only one major change, these draft provisions ultimately
became the final version signed into law on July 6, 1988, by Governor
Martinez.
8 7
The Senate Select Committee on AIDS initially proposed a limited
nondiscrimination provision. But at the urging of the Select Commit-
tee Chairman, Senator William Myers, 88 the Senate Commerce Com-
85. Mueller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 14 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 250, 254 (1986).
86. Dem., West Palm Beach.
87. Ch. 88-380, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2038.
88. Repub., Hobe Sound.
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mittee removed it before the Senate bill reached the floor. Senator
Myers indicated that the deletion was meant to leave the law as it then
existed.8 9 This statement corroborated Senator Myers' earlier represen-
tations to the Commerce Committee that the deletion also would put
the Senate in a position to bargain with the House.9 Thus, the House
bill largely framed the entire discussion of nondiscrimination policy.
The House Task Force draft contained the following pertinent non-
discrimination provisions which embodied and extended Shuttleworth:
A person may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified
individual in employment ... on the basis of the fact that such
individual is, or is regarded as being, infected with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus.
For the purposes of defining an unlawful employment practice
under §§ 760.01-760.10 [the Human Rights Act] for an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee, the term handicap shall include Human
Immunodeficiency Virus infection or the perception of such
infection.9l
The staff analysis and committee debate accompanying the draft indi-
cate that the purpose of these two provisions was to codify Shuttle-
worth and confirm that HIV infection and the perception of such
89. Senator Myers said:
There was a section in the bill that was taken out in-in Commerce, which had to do
with-with discrimination in employment. And even though it was rather mild-it
only mentioned the public law which makes-which states that AIDS is a disability-
and there is nothing in Florida law at the present time other than some human rights
statutes that does that-this was taken out in Commerce, and it is out, although in the
original House bill there were three or four pages on this. And this will be a subject,
and has been a subject, of our informal conference [with House delegates].
Fla. S., transcript of proceedings, at 5 (May 31, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State Univer-
sity Law Review) (comments of Sen. Myers).
90. Senator Myers stated:
The reason that-that I do that [take out the nondiscrimination provisions] is because
all of the talk and all of the holdup with the bill in the Senate has revolved around
discrimination. And so what I have done is with that amendment just taken the-even
the issue of the federal law out of that particular bill. That will be a conference issue,
I'm sure. And-but the thing is that I think in order for us to get into the posture
which is most comfortable to the Senate would be to take that out.
Fla. S., Comm. on Commerce, transcript of hearing at 19-20 (May 26, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Sen. Myers).
91. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07, §§ 72, 74 (draft of Apr. 13,
1988).
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infection were included within the meaning of the word "handicap." 92
Additionally, the first clause quoted above also extended Shuttleworth
to all employers, not merely those having fifteen or more employees
during certain periods of the year. During discussions in the April 13
Health Care Committee meeting, Representative Frankel stated that
these provisions would not change the Human Relation Commission's
definition of "handicap," but would codify the Commission's public
testimony that Shuttleworth extended to both HIV infection and the
perception of HIV infection. 9
These provisions, however, were deleted from the compromise bill
during closed-door informal negotiations in the final days of the 1988
session. 94 The 1988 Legislature's attitude toward Shuttleworth thus
hinges on the meaning accorded this deletion.
While deletion of a provision from a pending bill sometimes may
indicate disapproval of its subject matter, 95 here the entire course of
the Omnibus AIDS Act's evolution in the 1988 session suggests the
contrary. The final compromise bill shows that the House acquiesced
to many of the Senate demands on quarantine law, AIDS-related edu-
cation, testing, and confidentiality.9 6 In turn, the Senate acquiesced to
all of the nondiscrimination provisions except those designed to codify
92. See Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07 (1988) Staff Analysis
10 (2d rev. Apr. 13, 1988) (on file with committee). Health Care Analyst Tom Cooper indicated
that the purpose of these provisions was not to overrule the Human Relations Commission or in
any way indicate that Shuttleworth was erroneous, but to codify what generally was perceived as
Shuttleworth's essential holding:
Section 66 ... is an addition. It would add to the definition of the Florida Human
Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act, it would add the definition of "handicap"-
HIV infection. This is now, there, or at least based on the previous cases and the way
they currently interpret, uh, the law-uh, is consistent with that interpretation.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 13 (Apr. 7, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Staff Analyst Tom Cooper).
93. Representative Frankel stated:
[W]e heard extensive testimony from the Human Rights Commission on this point.
There is presently both federal and state law which have been determined by case law
including Supreme Court opinion, that AIDS is to be considered a handicap. What
has not yet been determined, although we have-we were told that most likely the-
the Human Rights Commission would determine that HIV would also be in that cate-
gory. And it was our feeling that certainly we should extend the same protections to a
person with HIV as we extend to a person with AIDS in regards to discrimination.
And we-we decided to put that in the law now so that the point would be clarified
and would avoid further litigation on that particular point.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 17-18 (Apr. 13, 1988) (transcript on
file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel).
94. Compare Fla. CS for HB 1519 (1988) (First Engrossed) with Fla. CS for HB 1519 (1988)
(Second Engrossed).
95. See Mayo v. American Agric'l Chem. Co., 101 Fla. 279, 133 So. 885 (1931).
96. Compare ch. 88-380, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996 (to be codified at scattered sections of FLA.
STAT.) with Fla. CS for HB 1519 (1988) and with Fla. CS for SB 1083 (1988).
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Shuttleworth and extend it to employers having fewer than fifteen
workers.
There is no indication the Legislature ever intended to disapprove
Shuttleworth. An effort to overrule Shuttleworth in the House failed
on a voice vote despite ardent debate by Representative Tom Wood-
ruff. 97 The subsequent vote of 108 to 9 in favor of the initial House
bill 9 indicated overwhelming support in that chamber for the essential
holding of Shuttleworth, which was embodied in the bill. The House's
subsequent acquiescence to the Senate position thus cannot be con-
strued as anything more than a concurrence with the Senate decision
to be silent on Shuttleworth, thereby refusing to extend it to employ-
ers with fewer than fifteen employees.
To interpret the deletion of these provisions as a sign of legislative
disapproval of Shuttleworth would be inconsistent with other nondis-
crimination provisions adopted by both the House and the Senate.
For instance, the final version of the bill expressly declared that
"[a]ny person with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome Related Complex, or Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus shall have every protection made available to handi-
capped persons under sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes, [the
Florida] Fair Housing Act." 99 This provision effectively defined HIV
infection and its related illnesses as a "handicap" under the Fair
Housing Act. Reading that Act in pari materia with the Human
Rights Act, which Shuttleworth interpreted, leads to the conclusion
that the Omnibus AIDS Act supported Shuttleworth's approach to
construing "handicap."
Three other rules of statutory construction also support this conclu-
sion. First, the construction placed on a statute by the agency author-
ized to administer it is entitled to great weight'0° unless clearly
unlawful or in conflict with the plain intent of the statute. I0 Thus, the
Commission's interpretation of the Human Rights Act, which is con-
sistent with the policy embodied in chapter 760, and which is certainly
not unlawful, is highly persuasive of its meaning.
Second, when the Legislature clearly has considered a construction
placed on a particular statute and then did not alter the statute, this
97. Repub., St. Petersburg, 1976-1988.
98. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 408 (Reg. Sess. May 11, 1988).
99. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50
(Supp. 1988)).
100. Public Employees Relations Comm'n v. Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 467 So.
2d 987 (Fla. 1987); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Yarborough, 275 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
101. McKinney v. State, 83 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1955); Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Larson,
147 Fla. 118, 2 So. 2d 386 (1941).
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constitutes some evidence that the construction is acceptable to the
Legislature. 02 Here, the 1988 Legislature did not choose to alter the
Commission's construction of the Human Rights Act despite Repre-
sentative Woodruff's plea to do so.
Third, in dealing with an ambiguous provision such as the unde-
fined term "handicap," the overall policies and purposes deducible
from related statutes should be used to guide construction.103 The leg-
islative history bears ample evidence of two new AIDS-related policies
underlying the Omnibus AIDS Act's nondiscrimination provisions, in
light of which Shuttleworth now must be read.
1. Policies Underlying the Nondiscrimination Provisions
The first of these new AIDS-related policies is that people with HIV
infection should be allowed to remain productive members of society
for as long as possible since society is not served by depriving them of
their livelihood. Second, an atmosphere of trust and rationality must
be created so that people at risk for HIV infection will want to be
tested voluntarily without fear of reprisal. For these reasons, the pri-
mary drafters of the Omnibus AIDS Act's nondiscrimination provi-
sions stated that Florida must prohibit all manifestations of AIDS-
related discrimination.
In a meeting of the House Health Care Committee on April 13,
1988, Representative Frankel elaborated the first of these policies. Af-
ter hearing Representative Frederick Lippman'04 predict that as many
as 200,000 Floridians may die of AIDS within the next eight years,
requiring annual state expenditures of as much as a billion dollars in
the 1990s,105 Representative Frankel agreed with this forecast and
stated:
[A] person with HIV infection can live many many years ... some
people will live far more than nine years without any symptoms. And
for those people, we need to allow them to stay productive citizens.
And if we eliminate from the mainstream of society people who are
able-bodied and able to be productive, we will increase our burden
much more than we have to. Because we will have on welfare people
not only who are sick, but people who are perfectly well. And that's
102. Johnson v. State, 91 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1956); White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532 (Fla.
1952). See Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953).
103. Weiss v. Leonardy, 160 Fla. 570, 36 So. 2d 184 (1948); In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla.
777, 32 So. 2d 840 (1947); Scarborough v. Newsome, 150 Fla. 220, 7 So. 2d 321 (1942).
104. Dem., Hollywood.
105. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 19-20 (Apr. 13, 1988) (tran-
script on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Lippman).
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why these antidiscrimination provisions and these insurance
provisions are so important, not only for the humanity angle of this
bill, but for sheer economic survival of our community. ,06
This statement was reiterated throughout other hearings and de-
bates. 107
During the same meeting, Representative Frankel also elaborated
the second of the state's new AIDS-related policies: to create an at-
mosphere of trust and rationality in which people will want to be
tested voluntarily. 0 8 Without that atmosphere, people likely to have
106. Id. at 20-21 (comments of Rep. Frankel).
107. For example, Representative Frankel told the full House:
And we cannot afford to take out of the workplace the million and a half Americans
who are presently infected [with] the virus. Because if we take them out of the work-
place, then who's going to take care of them and their family. We don't have the
resources to put a million and a half Americans who are able to work on welfare.-
Fla. H.R., transcript of debate at 8 (May 11, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University
Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel). See also Fla. S., Comm. on Commerce, transcript of
hearing at 4 (May 26, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review) (testimony
of Rep. Frankel):
Our medical doctors, our scientists, our researchers tell us that many of these people
can live healthy and productive [lives] for many many years before they ever get
AIDS. Or they may never get AIDS. They could for seven, nine, ten years. We cannot
afford to take these people out of the work force. We can't allow a-for a million and
a half Americans to be put on welfare just because they have HIV infection. We don't
have the government resources to take people-care of all those people on welfare, to
take care of their families, to take care of their medical bills, for non-not only for
AIDS related diseases-but for non-AIDS-related diseases. And so it is-it is to the
best public policy both for the state and for private industry that we keep people as
productive as long as possible.
Id. At the same hearing, Representative Frankel continued:
And you want to keep those people in society and productive for as long as possible.
And so I think what-what we attempt to do in our bill, we very well balance both the
rights of individuals and the rights of the public. And that's why we have in our bill
requirements that prohibit discrimination in employment and housing and use of pub-
lic accommodations, and require a reasonableness in insurance.
Id. at 5-6.
108. Representative Frankel said:
Another policy consideration which developed during testimony is that it is a very
important step in the fight against AIDS for HIV carriers to know if they are infected.
Although there's no cure, we want HIV carriers to know if they're infected because we
want them to act responsible. And we believe that the overwhelming majority of
Americans who are infected, if they know they're infected, will act responsibly, will
not want to harm people that they love. And so-and therefore we wanted to create
an atmosphere to encourage people to be tested. And we realize that it is impossible to
have a mandatory testing program for every American, and that we must encourage
individuals who believe they may be at risk to voluntarily take an HIV test. And there-
fore we felt it would be wrong-and it would be against good public policy-to create
an atmosphere of distrust, irrationality, or punitive sanctions, because we believe it
would force the disease underground.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 5-6 (Apr. 13, 1988) (transcript on
file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel).
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been exposed to AIDS would refuse to be tested and the disease would
be driven underground and become uncontrollable. °9 Similar com-
ments were reiterated throughout the hearings on the House bill. 10
This policy also is consistent with the recommendations of the Presi-
dential Commission studying the HIV epidemic.'"
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the deletion from the
compromise bill of the provisions which would have codified, clarified
and extended Shuttleworth constituted a rejection of these two poli-
cies. During the final House and Senate votes approving the Omnibus
AIDS Act, neither of the two primary sponsors of the bill suggested
anything to the contrary. Indeed, Representative Frankel indicated in
the final House debate on June 3 that the policies remained un-
changed by the compromise:
Yesterday the-the chairman of the White House AIDS commission
issued the Presidential AIDS Commission Task Force Report and
their top priority was to call for antidiscrimination and protection
for all AIDS and HIVpatients. And they said that the only way that
they believe that we can stop the spread of HIV infection in the
United States is through strong antidiscrimination laws. ... We
have taken their recommendations and it-they are consistent with
the provisions within our bill."2
109. Id. Representative Frankel also presented a hypothetical situation in which a person,
injured in an automobile accident in 1984, is told that he received a blood transfusion potentially
infected with HIV. In the hypothetical, the doctor informs the person that he should be tested
for HIV infection, but that if he is positive he could lose his housing and his job; he could be
denied governmental services and public accommodations; his name would be put on a list kept
by the state; and likely he would be arrested and detained so the state could determine whether
he should be quarantined. For this reason, Representative Frankel said, "We call for the protec-
tion of HIV carrier from discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodation and
governmental services." Id. at 6-7.
110. E.g., Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, Subcomm. on Health Regulation, transcript
of hearing at 3 (Apr. 11, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review) (com-
ments of Rep. Frankel) ("our bill tries to create this atmosphere of rationality and reasonable-
ness"); Fla. H.R., transcript of debate at 4 (May 10, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State
University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel) ("we have ... tried to create an atmos-
phere in this state which will encourage people to be voluntarily be tested"); Fla. S., Comm. on
Commerce, transcript of hearing at 5 (May 26, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University
Law Review) (testimony of Rep. Frankel) ("if we send the message out to the 200,000 people in
this state who are potentially infected about-about this disease-that you're going to lose eve-
rything you have by knowing you are infected, we will send this disease underground"); Fla.
H.R., transcript of debate at 11-12 (May 11, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University
Law Review) (comments of Rep. Abrams) (nondiscrimination provisions necessary to encourage
testing).
111. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 75.
112. Fla. H.R., transcript of proceedings at 5 (June 3, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State
University Law Review) (statements of Rep. Frankel) (emphasis added). In the final Senate de-
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The Presidential Commission made the following specific recommen-
dation for state nondiscrimination issues:
If not now the case, states should amend their disability laws to
prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities, including
persons with HIV infection who are asymptomatic or symptomatic,
and persons with AIDS, in public and private settings including
employment, housing, public accommodations, and governmental
services." 3
Thus, Representative Frankel's final report on the House-Senate com-
promise indicates that the nondiscrimination policies embodied in the
Omnibus AIDS Act remained very broad in scope.
The only reasonable conclusion is that by deleting the nondiscrimi-
nation provisions relating to employment, the Legislature did not in-
tend either to overrule Shuttleworth or to extend its reach to cover
businesses with fewer than fifteen workers. By refusing to redefine the
term "handicap" to exclude HIV infection or its related diseases, the
Legislature left the Commission's position on this question un-
changed.
Indeed, the Omnibus AIDS Act is incoherent if Shuttleworth is not
viewed as part of Florida law. Without Shuttleworth, the Omnibus
AIDS Act could be interpreted to prohibit discrimination in every area
of life except one of the most crucial: employment. As Representative
Frankel noted, no one will volunteer for testing unless he or she does
not fear the loss of a job; 1 4 nor can the state afford to place on the
public dole the scores of thousands of otherwise healthy people who
will become infected with HIV by the 1990s in Florida." 5 The policies
underlying the nondiscrimination provisions cannot be achieved unless
Shuttleworth is viewed as the keystone of the nondiscrimination provi-
sions and is read broadly with those policies in mind.
bate on June 6, Senator Myers made a cryptic and technically inaccurate reference to the antidis-
crimination provisions: "Discrimination language was very carefully crafted so not to have the
effect on business and in-when it comes to employees, there is just notes as to testing as a
prerequisite for the job." Fla. S., transcript of proceedings at 3 (June 6, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Sen. Myers). Actually, at least two other
provisions of the Act will impact significantly upon business: those relating to programs receiv-
ing state financial assistance and to information derived from test results. See infra notes 155-83,
210-27 and accompanying text.
113. PRESIDENTIAL COMIMSSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 124.
114. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. This conclusion also is reached by the Presi-
dential Commission. PREsIDENTAL COMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 119-20.
115. See supra note 107.
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2. The Omnibus AIDS Act as Remedial Legislation
Underscoring the vitality of these nondiscrimination policies is the
clearly remedial nature of both the Omnibus AIDS Act and the Hu-
man Rights Act." 6 Their separate nondiscrimination provisions are
designed to protect people afflicted with handicaps caused by HIV in-
fection or related illness. Additionally, the Omnibus AIDS Act and
Shuttleworth provide specific remedies to that class, either by way of
a complaint with the Human Relations Commission or a civil action
in the courts. Taken as a whole, the nondiscrimination provisions of
the Omnibus AIDS Act constitute a package of remedial legislation
intended to be an AIDS-specific supplement to the Human Rights Act
as interpreted in Shuttleworth. Both Acts must be read together to
deal with the questions of AIDS-related employment discrimination.
Florida law dictates that remedial legislation must be interpreted
liberally1 7 to achieve its underlying purposes."" Indeed, the rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed
does not apply to remedial legislation. In such legislation, the inten-
tion of the Legislature should be given effect whenever it can be ascer-
tained." 9 Applying these principles to the Omnibus AIDS Act, which
embodies Shuttleworth, it becomes apparent that "handicap" must be
viewed broadly to prohibit all forms of AIDS-related discrimina-
tion.12
0
First, there can be no question after the Omnibus AIDS Act that
"handicap" under Shuttleworth will be applied to ARC. Even the
special commission appointed by the Reagan administration con-
cluded that ARC must be considered one-in-the-same with AIDS.'12
Second, the intent underlying the nondiscrimination provisions is to
prohibit discrimination based on asymptomatic HIV infection. The
entire thrust of the policies underlying the Omnibus AIDS Act is
aimed most particularly at this group. The clear policy of Florida is to
encourage people at risk both to learn and be honest about their HIV
infection status, and to allow them to remain a productive part of
society for as long as possible. These policies cannot be achieved un-
less Shuttleworth is applied to asymptomatic carriers of HIV. Like-
116. As to the Human Rights Act, see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
117. Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977); State ex rel. Cooper v. Coleman, 138 Fla.
520, 189 So. 691 (1939).
118. Neville v. Leamington Hotel Corp., 47 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1950).
119. Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1920); Hadley v. Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65
So. 545 (1914); Jacksonville Elec. Co. v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 461, 45 So. 755 (1907).
120. This is consistent with the express remedial purpose of the Human Rights Act. See su-
pra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
121. PRESIDENTIAL CommlssioN REPORT, supra note 3, at xvii.
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wise, the Presidential Commission concluded that asymptomatic HIV
infection realistically cannot be separated from the related illnesses as-
sociated with AIDS and ARC. 1
22
Third, to achieve the policies of the Omnibus AIDS Act, "handi-
cap" under Shuttleworth should apply to discrimination based on the
perception of HIV infection. If actual HIV infection is not a valid
basis for discrimination, then perceived HIV infection also should not
be. The state cannot create an environment of trust and rationality
except by outlawing the discriminatory use of AIDS-related informa-
tion, even if that information is untrue. The act of discrimination
must be viewed from the employer's eyes-not in terms of the work-
er's objective status. This position is supported by the analysis of the
United States Supreme Court in School Board v. Arline.123
Finally, in light of the Omnibus AIDS Act, Shuttleworth also
should be interpreted to prohibit the preemptive discrimination
against people perceived to be at risk. To permit discrimination based
on the belief that a worker will contract HIV in the future would per-
mit employers to do in advance what they could not do later. The
effect would be no less contrary to the policies underlying the Omni-
bus AIDS Act as firing a person with HIV infection. Allowing pre-
emptive dismissal would breed distrust, discourage voluntary testing
and deprive workers of their livelihood for the very reasons the non-
discrimination provisions were designed to forbid. Therefore, in light
of the policies underlying the Omnibus AIDS Act, the Shuttleworth
definition of "handicap" should now include AIDS, ARC, HIV in-
fection and the perception of present or future HIV infection.
C. Applying Florida's Nondiscrimination Provisions to
Housing and Federal Law
In implementing its new AIDS-related policies, the Legislature
promulgated a series of new civil rights enactments. The first of these
explicitly requires that the term "handicap" be construed to include
HIV infection and its related diseases under Florida's Fair Housing
Act and the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.124 This provision ap-
peared abruptly in the House and Senate compromise bill during the
closing days of the session, and essentially was a shortened version of
122. Id.
123. 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1129 (1987) (employment decisions about actual or perceived handicaps
should be based on medically sound judgments, not myths).
124. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (Supp.
1988)). The initial Senate bill also stated that HIV infection and its related diseases would be
considered a handicap under the Florida Human Rights Act. Fla. SB 1083, § 28 (1988).
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the sole nondiscrimination provision that had appeared in the first
draft of the Senate bill, authored by Senator Myers.1
25
1. Florida's Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act prohibits discriminatory acts relating to the
sale or rental of dwellings, terms of a sale or rental, advertisements
for sale or rental, opening dwellings for inspection in hopes of sale or
rental, inducing another to sell or rent,' 26 providing real estate broker-
age services,' 27 or financing the sale or improvement of a dwelling.
128
Among the prohibited acts is discrimination based on "handicap."
The statute provides that a person is handicapped if that person has
"a physical impairment which substantially limits one or more major
life activities, or he has a record of having, or is regarded as having,
such physical impairment."'
29
There has been no administrative case law construing this prohibi-
tion on handicap discrimination. Moreover, only a single decision of
the Commission has even considered the import of the statute's defini-
tion of handicap, and then only to note in dicta that it did not include
mental handicaps. 30
The Omnibus AIDS Act provides that "[a]ny person with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome Related Complex, or Human Immunodeficiency Virus shall
have every protection made available to handicapped persons under
[Florida's Fair Housing Act]."'' The only reasonable interpretation is
that "handicap" under the Fair Housing Act has been extended to
include AIDS, ARC, and HIV. While it is possible to interpret this
provision to mean that such people will not be entitled to these protec-
tions unless they are independently available under the Fair Housing
Act, such an interpretation would render the language mere surplus-
age.
The perception of HIV-related infection also should be regarded as
a physical impairment protected under the Fair Housing Act. Section
760.22(5)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides the basic definition of
handicap, specifies that a person is handicapped if he or she "is re-
125. Fla. SB 1083, § 28, at 35, lines 19-29 (1988).
126. FLA. STAT § 760.23 (1987).
127. Id. § 760.24.
128. Id. § 760.25.
129. Id. § 760.22(5)(a).
130. Thomas v. Floridin Co., 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5457, 5459 (Fla. Comm'n on Human
Relations, Sept. 10, 1986).
131. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (Supp.
1988)).
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garded as having, such physical impairment. 1 13 2 This self-evident
meaning should require that the perception of HIV infection, ARC or
AIDS be treated as a handicap.
For the same reason, discrimination based on the possibility of fu-
ture HIV infection or disease also should be regarded as a handicap
under the Fair Housing Act.
The provision extending the Fair Housing Act's definition of
"handicap" was spliced onto a section of the Omnibus AIDS Act that
provides new civil remedies.' In the original Senate draft from which
this provision derived, no such remedy section existed. 3 4 Thus it is
unclear exactly how the new civil remedies relate to the extended defi-
nition of "handicap" under the Fair Housing Act, and no legislative
history addresses this point.
It is possible that the Legislature did not intend to create any new
housing-related remedies. However, the remedy section explicitly pro-
vides that "[any person aggrieved by a violation of this section shall
have a right of action in the circuit court and may recover [certain
specified remedies] for each violation."' 3 5 It makes no distinction be-
tween the various subsections, and does not exclude the section ex-
tending the definition of "handicap" under the Fair Housing Act.
To say that no specific cause of action is created for housing-related
discrimination is to give no effect to the remedy section as it is applied
in this context. Such a result violates an established rule of statutory
construction in which the court always will favor an interpretation of
two statutes that gives effect to both. 3 6 Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that the Legislature created a new and separate cause of ac-
tion for housing discrimination arising from HIV infection and dis-
ease or the perception thereof.
The effect is to allow plaintiffs to bypass the Commission alto-
gether and file an action directly in circuit court, notwithstanding the
Fair Housing Act's normal administrative procedure.3 7 Thus, for
HIV-related housing discrimination, an aggrieved party effectively is
given two alternative remedies: (1) the new civil cause of action, 3 8 or
132. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(5)(a) (1987).
133. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (Supp.
1988)).
134. Fla. SB 1083, § 28, at 35, lines 19-29 (1988).
135. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 770.50 (Supp.
1988)).
136. Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987).
137. See FLA. STAT. § 760.34 (1987).
138. See ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (Supp.
1988)).
1988]
470 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:441
(2) a complaint filed with the Commission. 3 9 Although this means
that HIV-related discrimination is accorded special status as a cause
of action, such a result is consistent with the remedial purposes of the
Omnibus AIDS Act and is the only way of giving effect to the two
provisions of the statute cited above.
2. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Omnibus AIDS Act provides in vague fashion that "[a]ny per-
son with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome Related Complex, or Human Immunodeficiency
Virus shall have every protection made available to handicapped per-
sons under" section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.140
Section 504 provides that
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.1
4
1
Thus, the federal protections incorporated by the Omnibus AIDS Act
apply exclusively to employees of the specified entities. In effect, the
Legislature has interposed its own interpretation of the Rehabilitation
Act by attempting to regulate HIV-related discrimination only as it
affects employees of federal executive agencies, postal workers, and
recipients of federal financial aid. This conclusion is reinforced by the
Legislature's decision not to make reference to other provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act, such as Section 503, which is applicable to certain
public contractors.
The Florida Legislature manifestly has no authority to regulate em-
ployment practices of federal executive agencies or the Postal Service,
to dictate the meaning of a federal statute, or to place conditions on a
federal grant without Congressional authorization. This fact was ap-
parent to those who drafted this provision. Its author, Senator Myers,
told the Senate Commerce Committee that the language was meaning-
less. Asking that it be deleted from the first Senate draft of the bill,
139. See FLA. STAT. § 760.34 (1987).
140. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (codified at FLA STAT. 760.55 (Supp.
1988)).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
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Senator Myers said, "I mean, it doesn't really say anything other than
there is a federal law."1
42
A few commentators have proposed viewing this provision as a cir-
cuitous attempt to prohibit job-related discrimination against anyone
with HIV-related infections, thus extending Shuttleworth to small bus-
inesses. 143 However, this is not what the statute says. The Legislature
easily could have made such an intent evident had it wished to do so,
without attempting to incorporate federal law. Moreover, such a
broad construction is contradicted by Senator Myers' statement and is
directly contrary to the Legislature's last-minute decision, discussed
above, not to extend Shuttleworth to businesses with fewer than fif-
teen workers.
For these reasons, this portion of the Omnibus AIDS Act appears
to be meaningless surplusage, a result plainly intended by its author.
Although the courts will favor an interpretation that gives effect to a
statute or renders it constitutional, no such interpretation appears rea-
sonable here.
D. Discrimination Based on HIV Tests
The second nondiscrimination provision in the Act, 144 derived al-
most word-for-word from the initial House Task Force proposal,
145
prohibits a wide range of potential employment practices relating to
HIV testing. Although Shuttleworth almost certainly prohibited simi-
lar kinds of discrimination, this fact does not mean these provisions
are mere surplusage. First, unlike Shuttleworth and the Human Rights
Act from which it is derived, the new testing provisions apply to all
employers, not just those with fifteen or more workers. Thus, they
will affect small businesses not previously falling under state handicap
antidiscrimination law. It is apparent that the Legislature hoped to
root out a practice that it found intolerable even in small businesses.
142. Fla. S., Comm. on Commerce, transcript of hearing at 20 (May 26, 1988) (transcript on
file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Sen. Myers). The evident meaning of
Senator Myers' statement was confirmed by the Omnibus AIDS Act's primary sponsor, Repre-
sentative Frankel. She indicated in an interview after the 1988 session that the clause alluding to
the Rehabilitation Act "probably has no legal effect" and that it was added only at the insis-
tence of the Senate. Interview with Rep. Lois Frankel, June 21, 1988, transcribed notes at 2
(transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review).
143. See Barford & Wiley, AIDS Discrimination in Florida: Further Restrictions on Employ-
ers' Rights, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 1988, at 45, 46-47; McHugh, AIDS in the Workplace: Policy,
Practice and Procedure, 18 STETSON L. REv. 35, 62 (1988).
144. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (Supp.
1988)).
145. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07, § 65(3), at 48-49 (draft of Apr.
7, 1988).
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Second, the intent underlying these provisions, read in light of their
remedial purpose, indicates that they were meant to outlaw most types
of discrimination resulting from HIV testing and the information de-
rived from those tests. The purpose, already elaborated above, 146 is to
create an environment in which people at risk will be willing to un-
dergo voluntary testing without fear of reprisal and to allow people
with HIV infection to remain productive for as long as possible.
1. Requiring Work-Related HIV Tests
The first operative provision of the testing subsection provides:
"No person may require an individual to take a Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus related test as a condition of hiring, promotion, or con-
tinued employment, unless the absence of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus infection is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] for
the job in question. ' 147 The plain effect of this language is to make it
unlawful for an employer to require an HIV test in making employ-
ment decisions except where the BFOQ exception applies.
One problem in construction is the term "no person" in the open-
ing clause. Although the term could be interpreted to mean a natural
person, it seems unlikely that a court would reach this result. The leg-
islative history itself indicates the contrary. In the April 13 meeting of
the Health Care Committee, Representative Charles T. Canady148
asked Representative Frankel whether this provision excluded any ar-
tificial entities. Representative Frankel responded that it did not.
149
Moreover, considering this provision in pari materia with the Human
Rights Act and Fair Housing Act, the term should be read broadly to
include artificial entities and legal agents.15 0
Such a conclusion is consistent with the purposes underlying this
provision. First, by prohibiting any employer from requiring tests as a
condition precedent to job-related decisions, the new legislation will
encourage an environment of trust and rationality in the workplace.
Second, it will prevent employers from engaging in efforts to weed out
146. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
147. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029-30 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2)(a)
(Supp. 1988)).
148. Dem., Lakeland.
149. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 13-14 (Apr. 13, 1988) (tran-
script on file, Florida State University Law Review).
150. This would include any individual, association, corporation, joint apprenticeship com-
mittee, joint-stock company, labor union, legal representative, mutual company, partnership,
receiver, trust, bankruptcy trustee, unincorporated organization, legal or commercial entity, and
any governmental entity or agency. Compare FLA. STAT. § 760.02(5) (1987) with id. § 760.22(6).
Accord id. § 1.01(3).
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HIV infected workers, thus allowing such people to remain productive
for as long as possible.
Finally, the statute elaborates a BFOQ exception' aimed specifi-
cally at those instances in which an employer seeks to require HIV-
related testing. This exception by its own terms applies only to "Hu-
man Immunodeficiency Virus-related testing" and requires that the
person asserting the BFOQ exception has the burden of proving: (1)
the test is necessary to ascertain whether an employee is currently able
to perform in a reasonable manner job-related duties or poses a signif-
icant risk of transmitting HIV to others; and (2) no reasonable means
of accommodation are available short of requiring the test. 5 2 Al-
though the term "BFOQ" is taken from a similar exception in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act),'" the two are
strikingly different in their language. 5 4 Thus, the case law interpreting
the federal BFOQ should not be considered persuasive in interpreting
the state BFOQ as it relates to employment-related HIV testing.
2. Discrimination Based on the Results of HIV Tests
The second operative provision of this section provides that most
employment decisions may not be made on the basis of the results of
an HIV test:
No person may fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive that individual of
employment opportunities or adversely affect his status as an
employee, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment on the basis of the results of a Human
Immunodeficiency Virus-related test, unless the absence of Human
Immnunodeficiency Virus infection is a bona fide occupational
qualification of the job in question.'
The phrase "on the basis of results of a Human Immunodeficiency
Virus-related test" presents three major problems of construction.
151. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029-30 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2)
(Supp. 1988)).
152. Id.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (Supp. III 1985).
154. The federal BFOQ exception allows discriminatory treatment of protected classes of
people if the employer can prove there is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or enterprise." Id. It does not deal
specifically with either testing for diseases or the likelihood of transmitting such a disease to
others.
155. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2030 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(d)
(Supp. 1988)).
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First, what is a "Human Immunodeficiency Virus-related test?" Sec-
ond, what degree of causal relationship must exist between the test
and the discriminatory act? And third, can an employer discriminate
based solely on the fact that a worker has taken a test without learn-
ing its results?
As to the first question, it is significant that the Omnibus AIDS Act
did not use the term "serologic test," as is done elsewhere in the
Florida Statutes. 5 6 Although it is possible to conclude that this provi-
sion of the Omnibus AIDS Act was intended to apply only to sero-
logic tests, nothing in the legislative history supports this limited
construction. The plain language of the statute should be regarded as
definitive, and this provision should be interpreted to apply to any
medical test, whether serologic or otherwise. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the fact that, under the guidelines of the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), AIDS can be diagnosed only through a series of med-
ical tests that need not always include the serologic test for HIV anti-
body.'57 Indeed, the CDC reports that in major urban areas hard-hit
by the disease, less than seven percent of all AIDS cases are diagnosed
using the serologic test. 58 Confining this provision specifically to the
serologic test would limit the protections in a way that is inconsistent
with the legislative intent.
This provision of the Omnibus AIDS Act requires some nexus be-
tween the result of an HIV-related test and the employer's discrimina-
tory act. However, the Omnibus AIDS Act does not specify how
closely related the discriminatory act must be to the test result. This
provision could be read broadly to cover any discriminatory act re-
lated to HIV because HIV and its related illness cannot be diagnosed
absent testing. Most information about a person's HIV status origi-
nates from an HIV-related test, even when the person has developed
full-blown AIDS. Opportunistic infections themselves can be diag-
nosed as AIDS-related only through proper medical tests.5 9 Even
156. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 381.606(5) (1987).
157. CDC Case Definition, supra note 66, at 4S-6S.
158. The urban areas are New York and San Francisco, which together account for a third
of all AIDS cases nationwide. Id. at 7S.
159. Herman, AIDS: Malpractice and Transmission Liability, 58 U. CoLo. L. REV. 63, 64-66
(1986); CDC Case Definition, supra note 66, at 4S-8S. The CDC Case Definition of AIDS,
considered legally definitive, involves a complicated five-step procedure that necessitates a num-
ber of tests. First, the physician must rule out any other diseases known to cause immuno-
suppression. These include a number of cancers such as Hodgkin's disease, certain forms of
lymphoma, certain forms of leukemia, multiple myeloma, and cancers that primarily attack
components of the immune system. In addition, the physician must rule out any congenital de-
fect in the immune system and determine whether the patient has taken drugs, such as steroids,
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Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, the most common opportunistic in-
fection,'16 cannot be distinguished from other types of pneumonia
without the use of specific tests.'
6'
A broad interpretation of this provision, however, could lead to
far-reaching results inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature.
This provision of the Omnibus AIDS Act applies to all employers,
whereas Shuttleworth, which construed the Human Rights Act, ap-
plies only to employers with fifteen or more employees. Reading this
provision with Shuttleworth could extend Shuttleworth's holding to
employers with fewer than fifteen workers, thus bringing even small
businesses under the full force of the state's AIDS-specific nondis-
crimination laws. The House-Senate compromise reached in the final
that tend to suppress the immune system. Id. at 4S-5S.
Second, if all these causes are ruled out, a diagnosis of AIDS is warranted if the patient exhib-
its one of the twelve "indicator" diseases of which the most common are Pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia and Kaposi's sarcoma. The CDC recommends that these "indicator" diseases can be
definitely diagnosed only after tissue samples are taken and examined under a microscope, while
certain other secondary "indicator" infections can be diagnosed only by culturing them in a
laboratory. Id. at 4S, 1OS-12S (app. I & II).
Third, where none of these twelve diseases exist, the physician still may diagnose AIDS if the
patient has consistently tested positive for the presence of HIV antibody and also exhibits one of
a long list of diseases now known to be caused by HIV-related immunosuppression. These in-
clude tuberculosis affecting organs other than the lungs, histoplasmosis, "HIV dementia,"
"HIV wasting syndrome," Salmonella infection of the bloodstream, lymphomas, certain severe
bacterial infections and some rare forms of chronic diarrhea. Again, these infections can only be
definitively diagnosed by microscopic analysis of tissue samples or laboratory culturing. Id. at
5S-6S, IOS-12S (app. I & II).
Fourth, where the patient's ill health or the absence of adequate laboratory facilities will not
permit the usual diagnostic tests, the physician can diagnose AIDS where there are repeatedly
positive HIV tests and presumptive evidence of one of the seven most serious "indicator" dis-
eases. Id. at 5S-6S, 13S-14S (app. III). "Presumptive evidence" means evidence obtained from
tests or examinations not considered "definitive" by the CDC. Compare id. at 1OS-12S (app. I &
II) with id. at 13S-14S (app. III).
Fifth, even where the patient consistently tests negative for HIV antibodies, the physician may
diagnose AIDS in two special circumstances, provided the physician has ruled out all other
causes of immunosuppression. First, the physician may diagnose AIDS if definitive clinical evi-
dence (i.e. microscopic analysis of tissue samples) clearly shows the presence of Pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia, which occurs almost exclusively in people with AIDS. Second, the physician
may diagnose AIDS if he or she clinically establishes the presence of any of the other eleven
indicator diseases combined with a T-lymphocyte count in a blood sample of less than 400,
which indicates severe immunosuppression. Id. at 6S, IOS-12S (app. I & II).
It is obvious from this Case Definition that AIDS cannot be diagnosed without some form of
testing. Thus, no one can know a person has AIDS, as that term is defined under the law,
without some testing.
160. See MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 180-81.
161. Herman, supra note 159, at 65. See CDC Case Definition, supra note 66, at 13S (pneu-
mocystis is diagnosed only after chest X-ray, arterial blood gas analysis, and examination of
lungs for bacterial infection).
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days of the 1988 session indicates that this result was not intended.
62
Another reasonable construction of this nondiscrimination provi-
sion is possible. The Legislature may not have intended this law to
govern a small employer's reaction to visible symptoms of illness. In-
stead, it might have intended only to prohibit the employment-related
use of information that was or, assuming it's truth, could only derive
from an HIV-related test. 63 Such a construction is reasonable because
the primary effect of the testing provisions is to bring small businesses
under at least a few of the restrictions encompassed within Shuttle-
worth. The Legislature may have made a conscious decision that,
while larger businesses having fifteen or more workers during portions
of the calender year should be put to a very strict standard, the bur-
den on businesses with fewer than fifteen workers should be dimin-
ished.
162. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. This problem was the subject of a brief
and cryptic exchange in the final House debate on June 3 between Representatives Frankel and
Woodruff, which casts some light on the subject:
REP. WOODRUFF: But as I understand ... your intent in relating to the employ-
ment that this particular area is only as to testing or tests, and is not to be interpreted
beyond testing or tests.
REP. FRANKEL: Or the use of those tests.
REP. WOODRUFF: Correct.
REP. FRANKEL: Yes.
Fla. H.R., transcript of proceedings at 7 (June 3, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State Univer-
sity Law Review). These comments may have referred to an earlier objection Representative
Woodruff had raised about the testing provisions:
So I would suggest to all the employers in this room that this bill, while well intended
in this provision, is technically drawn wrong and you should adopt my amendment to
strike this provision of the bill, because otherwise while you may not be able to test
people for AIDS virus, if they have AIDS that doesn't require a test, you wouldn't be
able to fire them if this provision of the bill comes into play.
Id. at 4-5. This comment is technically inaccurate, since "AIDS" as defined by the CDC cannot
be diagnosed without testing. See supra note 159.
163. Several consequences flow from such construction. First, a patient alleging discrimina-
tion based on full-blown AIDS or ARC symptoms would have to prove that the employer acted
specifically on the basis of medical test results. The employer could successfully defend by estab-
lishing that he or she acted purely on the basis of visible symptoms of the disease, such as oppor-
tunistic infections or absenteeism. Second, an asymptomatic HIV carrier could not be
discriminated against based entirely on his or her infection without violating this provision. Since
symptomless HIV infection can only be detected by testing, the employer's actions in such cir-
cumstances always must be based on an HIV-related test result. Third, discrimination based
wholly on the mere perception of HIV infection also must constitute a violation of this provi-
sion. Such information, if true, could only be derived from an HIV-related test, viewing the
discriminatory act from the eyes of the employer. Finally, preemptive discrimination against
persons perceived as likely to contract HIV infection also must be considered unlawful. Because
of the long incubation period of the disease, such actions effectively are the same as discriminat-
ing based on a present perception. Such information, if true, could only be derived from an
HIV-related test.
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However, such a construction seems directly contrary to the two ex-
plicit purposes that authors of the Omnibus AIDS Act consistently
identified as their guiding principles. 64 If small businesses are permit-
ted to discriminate against qualified people with overt symptoms of
AIDS or ARC, those people will not be allowed to remain productive
citizens for as long as possible. Indeed, they are likely to be reduced to
poverty and become public wards, a result Representative Frankel
stated is directly contrary to the purpose of the Omnibus AIDS Act.
Nor will this practice create an atmosphere of trust and rationality in
which people at risk can be tested voluntarily without fear of reprisal.
A person considering testing may decide ignorance is better than risk-
ing a positive test result, which could cause a pretextual dismissal or
other discrimination.
An exception in this provision states that an employer should not be
allowed to engage in a test-related discriminatory act "unless the ab-
sence of [HIV] infection is a bona fide occupational qualification."'
' 65
This language suggests that the underlying intent was to forbid dis-
crimination based on the belief a person is HIV infected, which can be
learned only through testing. Such construction renders the testing
provisions as expansive as Shuttleworth, but it reconciles the statute
with the purposes consistently advocated by its authors. i6
Thus, an obvious tension exists between the fundamental purposes
of the testing provisions and the events surrounding the final House-
Senate compromise. While a court might be justified in adopting ei-
ther interpretation elaborated above, a better alternative may be a hy-
brid of the two. That is, a court might interpret the testing provisions
liberally to achieve their purposes, but also interpret the BFOQ excep-
tion broadly, in a manner consistent with that employed in analogous
federal case law, allowing an employer to take some action dispropor-
tionately affecting HIV-infected workers. 16 7
The result would be to forbid discrimination against people with
AIDS, ARC, HIV infection or the perception of any of these. How-
164. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
165. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029-30 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
166. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
167. E.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1984). Repre-
sentative Frankel indicated during the February 29, 1988, AIDS Task Force meeting that the
BFOQ was analogous to that contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She stated:
That would mean that, unless they could show that you're not having it-that, that
for you to do the job, you have to be HIV-infection free. They'd have to show that it
was a-a reasonably-a reasonable relationship to the job, just as they do in-under
Title VII now.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 38 (Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel).
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ever, the employer could defend a suit by showing that the employee's
overt symptoms justified the action taken. Evidence of pretextual dis-
crimination would vitiate the defense. The employer would be re-
quired to show that it treated the HIV-infected individual no
differently than it would have treated any other individual suffering
an illness or condition of similar magnitude. This construction would
give effect to the Legislature's eleventh-hour decision not to bring
small businesses under the full scope of Shuttleworth,16 but also
would honor the purposes underlying the nondiscrimination provi-
sions.
Reading the BFOQ exception expansively may seem contrary to the
elements of BFOQ set forth in the testing provisions. However, it is
apparent from the language of the BFOQ "definition" provided in
the Omnibus AIDS Act that it applies only to those instances in which
an employer actually requires that a test be taken-the first testing
provision.' 69 The employer asserting a BFOQ must prove that a "test
is necessary" to ascertain job performance and that no reasonable
means of accommodation exists "short of requiring the test.'"
7 0
This language plainly is inapplicable to the second testing provision
which forbids discrimination only "on the basis of the results of a...
test" 1 7' and does not deal with requiring testing in the workplace. A
court accordingly would be free, and indeed would be required, to
define BFOQ differently for the second testing provision.
Since the BFOQ language of the second testing provision is derived
from Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act,' 72 a Florida court would
be justified in interpreting the BFOQ exception of the second testing
provision in a manner consistent with analogous federal case law. The
federal judiciary has developed a three-part framework for analysis of
the BFOQ question.
168. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
169. The introductory sentence of the BFOQ "definition" states that:
A person who asserts that a bona fide occupational qualification exists for [HIV]-
related testing shall have the burden of proving that:
1. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus-related test is necessary to ascertain whether
an employee is currently able to perform in a reasonable manner the duties of the
particular job or whether an employee will present a significant risk of transmitting
Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection to other persons in the course of normal
work activities; and
2. There exists no means of reasonable accommodation short of requiring the test.
Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2030 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(c) (Supp. 1988))
(emphasis added).
170. Id. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
171. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2030 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
172. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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First, if the employer has engaged in a facially discriminatory act
against a person of the protected class, the employer must prove that
the members of that class lack characteristics "reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
' 1 73
In the context of HIV infections, an employer is forbidden from
adopting policies that facially discriminate against people solely be-
cause of their infections unless the BFOQ, as defined in the federal
case law, could be proved. An employer could not adopt a policy of
firing people with AIDS, ARC or HIV infection without showing that
the absence of these infections and illnesses are reasonably necessary
to normal business operations.
Second, when an employer adopts what on its face is a neutral pol-
icy that disparately impacts the protected class, the affected people
may challenge it as a mere "pretext" for unlawful discrimination.'
74
The employer then may defend a suit by articulating a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. At this point, the burden of
proof shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the real one.' 75 Thus, an employer lawfully could
maintain policies that might result in disparate treatment of people
with AIDS, ARC or HIV infection, such as a policy against excessive
absenteeism due to illness. But the policy would have to be applied
equally to all workers suffering any type of illness, not merely those
with HIV-related illnesses. If such a policy applied only to workers
with HIV illnesses, it would constitute an impermissible pretext. 
76
Third, a facially neutral policy that results in a "disproportionate
impact" on members of the protected class also will be considered
presumptively unlawful. 77 However, once a plaintiff has shown dis-
proportionate impact, the employer can defend by showing a "busi-
ness necessity.' 1 78 That is, there must be an "overriding legitimate
business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business."' 79 Nevertheless, affected members
of the protected class may rebut the employer's business necessity de-
fense by showing acceptable alternative policies that would better ac-
complish the business purpose in question, or would accomplish it
with less adverse impact on the protected class. 8 0 In the context of
173. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
174. Id.
175. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981).
176. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-07 (1972).
177. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547.
178. Id.
179. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1188 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)).
180. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1543.
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HIV-related infections, a policy against excessive absenteeism due to
illness would have a disproportionate impact on people with AIDS or
ARC. An employer, however, could establish a business necessity de-
fense by showing that no other reasonable alternative existed for the
safe and efficient operation of the business.
Reading this federal analytic framework into the BFOQ exception
of the second testing provision harmonizes the apparent contradiction
between the Omnibus AIDS Act's underlying policies and the legisla-
tive history from the 1988 session's final days. It permits small busi-
nesses a greater degree of latitude in dealing with AIDS-related
concerns while offering significant protection to people with HIV-re-
lated illnesses. In this way, the policies of encouraging voluntary test-
ing and permitting people with AIDS to remain productive will be
advanced. 1
8 1
The 1989 Legislature should consider either modifying its BFOQ
definition to apply explicitly to both of the testing provisions of the
Omnibus AIDS Act, or it should indicate that BFOQ does indeed
have a different meaning in each of them.18
2
The second problem of construction presented by this provision is
whether an employer legally can discriminate based on knowledge that
181. This construction is consistent with the effect Representative Frankel said was intended
when the BFOQ exception was extensively discussed in the February 29, 1988, AIDS Task Force
meeting. There, she said:
[I]f we're going to prohibit discrimination, which I believe that we should, uh, we
have-I think that it is good policy to take into consideration that there may [be] that
one time or that one instance-although I quite frankly can't think of one-but there
may be that instance where it would be reasonable and in the interest of public health
that a person be denied a particular job because of HIV infection.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 43 (Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel). See also Fla. S., Comm. on
Commerce, transcript of hearing at 12 (May 26, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State Univer-
sity Law Review) (Rep. Frankel indicated that, at least with regard to small businesses, factors
such as business necessity may be taken into account.).
182. For the sake of simplicity, the former would seem the better option. The Omnibus
AIDS Act should define a BFOQ in the following manner:
For purposes of this section, a bona fide occupational qualification exists when:
1. The plaintiff actually was infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus at any
time material to the complaint; and
2. The absence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection is necessary for the
plaintiff to perform in a reasonable manner the duties of the particular job, or the
plaintiff will present a significant risk of transmitting Human Immunodeficiency Virus
infection to other persons in the course of normal work activities; and
3. There exists no means of reasonable accommodation short of requiring that the
plaintiff be free of Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection.
The employer should have the burden of proving each element. Finally, if the Legislature intends
to exempt businesses with less than 15 workers from the testing provisions, it should do so ex-
plicitly, and not by vague references in the legislative history.
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a worker has taken a test when test results are unknown to the em-
ployer. Read literally, the Omnibus AIDS Act does not prohibit such
actions because the statute only outlaws discrimination based on "the
results of a[n HIV-] related test." 83
However, since the policies underlying the Omnibus AIDS Act are
to encourage voluntary testing and to allow HIV-infected people to
remain productive, this provision should be construed broadly to pro-
hibit such discrimination. Workers at risk for infection will be dis-
couraged from taking an HIV test if the employer can fire them upon
learning that they were tested. The policies underlying the Omnibus
AIDS Act thus dictate that this provision be read broadly, beyond the
literal meaning of its words. However, the 1989 Legislature should
take action to correct its oversight by expressly outlawing discrimina-
tion based on the employer's knowledge that a worker has taken an
HIV-related test.
E. Discrimination in Housing, Accommodations
and Governmental Services
The third new civil rights provision is a sweeping prohibition
against certain discriminatory acts outside the workplace. The provi-
sion provides: "A person may not discriminate against an otherwise
qualified individual in housing, public accommodations, or govern-
mental services on the basis of the fact that such individual is, or is
regarded as being, infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus."9 84
This section presents several problems for construction, chiefly in the
failure to define terms such as "person" and "otherwise qualified."
As previously noted, the term "person" could be read restrictively
to include only "natural persons" and not artificial entities. 8 ' How-
ever, such a construction is contrary to the legislative history,8 6 to
traditional rules of statutory construction, 8 7 and to the remedial pur-
poses of the Omnibus AIDS Act, 8 8 and would subvert its underlying
policies. 8 9 It seems most likely that a court would construe the term
liberally, in pari materia with the broad definitions of "person" pro-
183. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2030 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
184. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
185. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
187. See FLA. STAT. § 1.01(3) (1987) (defining the word "person" to include artificial entities
for purposes of statutory construction).
188. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
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vided in the Human Rights Act and Fair Housing Act, which include
artificial entities.'
9
The term "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" is taken
from section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. '9, Thus, Florida courts are
likely to consider federal case law on this question persuasive. The
United States Supreme Court has defined the term to mean "one who
is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handi-
cap."1 92 Thus, a person or entity would be allowed legally to discrimi-
nate if a person's handicap or other condition made it impossible to
meet the program's requirements; but it would be unlawful if the
handicap or other condition had no such effect.
The Omnibus AIDS Act adds a special condition to the meaning of
the term "otherwise qualified" that requires a slightly broader inter-
pretation than the prior federal law suggests. It mandates that the per-
son asserting that an individual is not otherwise qualified must carry
the burden of proving that no reasonable accommodation could be
made to prevent the likelihood of exposing others to "a significant
possibility of being infected with [HIV."' 193 This statutory addition
effectively means that a person is not otherwise qualified if (1) HIV-
related symptoms or other conditions impair the ability to meet pro-
gram requirements, or (2) the HIV infection is likely to be communi-
cated to others despite any available reasonable means of
accommodation.
1. Discrimination in Housing
The term "housing," while not particularly vague, should be read
in pari materia with the definition of "dwelling" contained in the Fair
Housing Act. Under this definition, "dwelling" includes any building
or structure designed for occupancy by one or more families or single
individuals, and any vacant land offered for sale or lease to construct
such a building or structure. 94 It is reasonable to interpret the term
"housing" in this way because the same actions prohibited under this
provision of the Omnibus AIDS Act in most cases will be similarly
prohibited under the Fair Housing Act.
Based on this definition of "housing," the Omnibus AIDS Act
overlaps protections afforded under the Fair Housing Act. A person
190. See supra notes 56-59. Compare FLA. STAT. § 760.02(5) (1987) with id. § 760.22(6).
191. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1987).
192. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
193. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2030 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(c)
(Supp. 1988)).
194. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(3)-(4) (1987).
OMNIBUS AIDS ACT
alleging AIDS-related discrimination in housing could pursue relief ei-
ther with the Human Relations Commission or in court. Moreover,
the protections afforded in this area will be broad. The express lan-
guage of this provision forbids discrimination based on any HIV in-
fection or the perception thereof. This prohibition also should include
discrimination based on the perception that a person is likely to de-
velop an HIV-related infection in the future. The Omnibus AIDS Act
essentially provides the broadest possible protections in housing cases.
2. Discrimination in Public Accommodations
Perhaps the most troublesome of the undefined terms is "public ac-
commodations." While there is authority from other jurisdictions that
this term only includes lodging facilities and establishments serving
food and drink for consideration, 195 the common law of Florida has
given it a broader meaning. The Supreme Court of Florida has stated
that "public accommodations" also may be places of amusement
available for a consideration, such as theaters, swimming pools, 196 and
bath houses. 97 Thus it seems likely that the courts will construe the
term to include virtually any facility available for a consideration that
provides lodging, food and drink, or amusement.
Using Florida's broad definition of "public accommodation," a
cause of action would exist whenever a person is excluded from any
place of lodging, a food or drink establishment, or a place of amuse-
ment because of HIV-related infection or the perception that a person
has such infection now or will have it in the future.
One apparent oversight in the Omnibus AIDS Act, however, is that
it does not expressly prohibit discrimination by emergency services,
such as ambulances. Although some emergency services will fall under
the prohibition of discrimination in governmental services because
they are provided by public agencies, 9 not all will. While the courts
might construe the term "public accommodations" to include emer-
gency services, the Legislature should expressly outlaw such discrimi-
nation in the 1989 "AIDS glitch bill,"' 99 either by defining "public
accommodations" to include it or by adding a separate substantive
provision.
195. E.g., People ex rel. McShane v. Keller, 96 Misc. 92, 161 N.Y.S. 132, 138 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1916).
196. Central Theatres v. Wilkinson, 18 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1944) (en banc).
197. Turlington v. Tampa Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 398, 56 So. 696 (1911) (bathhouse and beach
facilities available for consideration).
198. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
199. Major legislation such as the Omnibus AIDS Act usually is followed in the succeeding
year with a "glitch bill" that corrects errors and oversights in the previous bill.
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3. Discrimination in Governmental Services
The term "governmental services" should be accorded its plain
meaning: any service provided by a governmental entity, whether for
a price or not. Case law from the district courts of appeal indicates
that the term includes at least police protection, sanitary improve-
ments, lights, water, electricity, sewerage, paved streets and "other
municipal conveniences." 200 The Florida Supreme Court has indicated
that the term includes at least police, fire and health protection, sew-
erage, water, and garbage service. 20' One district court opinion states
that providing water is a governmental service, and implies that health
measures and zoning ordinances also are closely related to such serv-
ices. 202 If "governmental services" includes any service that a govern-
mental entity provides, then in addition to those services listed above,
it should encompass education in a public school, public transporta-
tion, other services provided by governmental entities, and public
health services available to qualified individuals.
In the area of entitlements, the legislative history indicates that
while state agencies effectively must blind themselves to a person's
HIV status, people with HIV infection will not be accorded special
status. In the House Health Care Committee meeting on April 13,
Representative C. Fred Jones23 asked whether this provision might re-
quire the state to fund a massive program to provide the drug Azi-
dothymidine (AZT) and free hospice care to HIV-infected people.
Representative Frankel indicated that it would not. 204 Thus, people
with AIDS will be entitled to receive only benefits for which they
would be otherwise qualified. Under the Omnibus AIDS Act's restric-
tive definition, "otherwise qualified" means that a person can meet
program requirements and does not pose a significant possibility of
infecting others with HIV through participation in the program in
question despite available means of reasonable accommodation. 205
Because "governmental services" has a broad meaning, this section
of the Omnibus AIDS Act effectively will permit a person to sue gov-
ernmental agencies. A cause of action would exist whenever the
agency discriminates in the provision of services based on a person's
200. Johnson v. Town of Suwannee River, 336 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); State ex
rel. Tropical Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. City of Islandia, 224 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
201. Gillete v. City of Tampa, 57 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1952) (en banc).
202. Moviematic Indus. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667, 668-69 (Fla. 3d DCA
1977).
203. Dem., Auburndale.
204. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 11-12 (Apr. 13, 1988) (tran-
script on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Reps. Frankel and Jones).
205. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
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HIV-related infections or the perception of them. As noted above,
this probably would include discrimination based on a belief that a
person is likely to be diagnosed as HIV infected at some future time.
It is important to note that such a lawsuit falls within the state's
absolute waiver of sovereign immunity. 2°6 However, a limited form of
"governmental immunity" remains in Florida, based partly on the
state constitution's separation of powers provision. 207 In general, law-
suits are barred if the cause arises from "discretionary" governmental
activities, but not if the governmental act in question is considered
"operational." The distinction between the two never has been drawn
with precision by the Supreme Court of Florida, but involves a gen-
eral balancing of various factors. They include determining that the
act involved basic policy, was aimed at achieving that policy, required
a high level of expertise, and rested on valid legal authority. 208 Law-





F. Discrimination by Entities Receiving State Financial Assistance
The Omnibus AIDS Act states: "A person or other entity receiving
or benefiting from state financial assistance may not discriminate
against an otherwise qualified individual on the basis of the fact that
such individual is, or is regarded as being, infected with Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus." 21 0 This provision, like that outlawing discrim-
ination in housing, accommodations and governmental services,
applies broadly to any discriminatory act based on either actual
knowledge or belief that a person is HIV infected or will become HIV
infected. This is in keeping with the underlying purposes of encourag-
ing voluntary testing and keeping HIV-infected people a part of the
work force as long as possible.
211
Only two problems of construction are posed by this section that
are not illuminated by any of the legislative history. Again, the term
206. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1987).
207. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. See also Avallone v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 So. 2d
1002, 1005 (Fla. 1986); Trianaon Park Condominium v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 917
(Fla. 1985); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (Fla.
1979).
208. See Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1019 (adopting Evangelical United Brethren
Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440, 445 (1965)). See also id. at 1021-22 (adopt-
ing Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 794-95, 447 P.2d 352, 360-61, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248-49
(1968)).
209. Id. at 1021-22.
210. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2030 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
211. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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"otherwise qualified" is not fully defined, but should be interpreted
to mean that (1) a person's HIV-related symptoms or other conditions
do not impair the ability to meet program requirements, and (2) the
person's HIV infection is not likely to be communicated to others in
the setting in question despite reasonable means of accommodation.
2 1 2
This is in harmony with analogous federal case law and the explicit
statutory requirement contained in the Omnibus AIDS Act.
The other problem of construction is the undefined term "state fi-
nancial assistance." Since this term essentially tracks similar language
in the federal Rehabilitation Act, 2 3 it is likely that Florida courts will
look to federal precedent on this question for guidance.
Several conclusions can be derived from the federal authority. First,
the term "financial assistance" means a subsidy214 or grant to a defi-
nite recipient.2 1 5 It is not enough that an entity merely benefits from a
program financed by public funds, unless the entity directly receives a
part of those funds. For example, the United States Supreme Court
has held that there is no "financial assistance" to airlines merely be-
cause federal funds support the nation's air traffic control system,
since this program has many beneficiaries but no recipients.2 1 6 Thus,
the Omnibus AIDS Act probably cannot be read to create a cause of
action against entities benefiting from state-funded programs where
those entities do not actually receive state money or have no discretion
over how it will be used.
Second, government contracts generally do not constitute a "sub-
sidy" under federal law and thus would not bring the contractor un-
der section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 217 It appears that this
provision of the Omnibus AIDS Act will not apply to those people
entering into contracts with the State of Florida. However, in some
instances it may be possible to structure a state contract so that, in
addition to contractual payments, the contractor also is receiving what
amounts to a state subsidy. In such instances Florida courts may en-
212. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
213. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1987).
214. "A grant of money made by government in aid of the promoters of any enterprise,
work, or improvement in which the government desires to participate, or which is considered a
proper subject for government aid, because such purpose is likely to be of benefit to the public."
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1280 (5th ed. 1979).
215. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986);
Hingson v. Pacific Northwestern Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1984); Martin v.
Delaware Law School of Widener Univ., 625 F. Supp. 1288, 1302 (D. Del. 1985); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
216. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 612.
217. Cf. Bellamy v. Roadway Express, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 615, 618 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
OMNIBUS AIDS ACT
tertain suits brought under this section of the Omnibus AIDS Act,
since failure to do so would create a loophole inconsistent with the
legislative intent.
Third, beneficial tax treatment does not constitute a subsidy,
whether accomplished by tax credits218 or exemptions. 2 9 It thus is un-
likely that any entity receiving only favorable state tax treatment falls
under this provision of the Omnibus AIDS Act.
Finally, there is an important difference between the language of
the federal Rehabilitation Act and this provision of the Omnibus
AIDS Act. Prior to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,220 the
Rehabilitation Act only applied to "any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. ' ' 22' The Omnibus AIDS Act, however,
explicitly applies to "[a] person or other entity receiving or benefiting
from state financial assistance." 
2
The Rehabilitation Act focuses more narrowly on particular pro-
grams while the Omnibus AIDS Act looks more broadly at the overall
entity or person. This language indicates that so long as the person or
entity is receiving state financial assistance, liability would exist for a
discriminatory act even if the particular program in question did not
directly receive state financial assistance. The Omnibus AIDS Act
should not be limited only to the program that has engaged in a dis-
criminatory act, but the overall institution or entity.
The Omnibus AIDS Act does not limit the application of this sec-
tion only to nongovernmental persons or entities. The language is
broad and unqualified, and should be construed to apply equally to
any governmental entity subsidized with public funds. This construc-
tion is compelled by reading the Omnibus AIDS Act in tandem with
the state's waiver of sovereign immunity.
2 3
The waiver of sovereign immunity declares that any agency or sub-
division of the state may be held liable for actions in tort "under cir-
cumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant, in accordance with the
general laws of this state. ' 224 It further specifies that agencies and
218. Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 628 F. Supp. 143, 145-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
219. Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener Univ., 625 F. Supp. 1288, 1302 (D. Del.
1985).
220. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1988).
221. Compare id. with id. (West Supp. 1987) (quoted language is the same, but the term
"program or activity" has been expansively redefined).
222. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2030 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
223. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1987).
224. Id. § 768.28(1).
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subdivisions include all the branches of government, "independent es-
tablishments of the state; counties and municipalities; and corpora-
tions primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the state,
counties or municipalities. ' 225 Since this provision of the Omnibus
AIDS Act applies to "persons," it is reasonable to conclude that it
also applies to all the entities described in the waiver of immunity.
2 26
Another significant feature of the provision banning discrimination
by state-subsidized entities is that, because it is not limited to particu-
lar kinds of discriminatory acts, it applies equally to employment,
participation in programs, or anything for which a person can become
qualified. 227 This section is one of the most sweeping of the new anti-
discrimination provisions. It both codifies and extends the holding of
Shuttleworth as applied to such entities.
Moreover, it effectively prevents every governmental agency or
state-supported entity or person from engaging in any other kind of
discriminatory act based on knowledge or perception of HIV infec-
tion. By enacting this provision, the Legislature has indicated that the
policies underlying the nondiscrimination provisions are so important
that neither the state nor those it subsidizes may engage in discrimina-
tion based on HIV-related concerns.
G. Discrimination Against Health Care Workers
The Omnibus AIDS Act provides that:
No person may fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual,
segregate or classify any individual in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive that individual of employment opportunities or
adversely affect his or her status as an employee, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of the
fact that the individual is a licenced health care professional who
treats or provides patient care to persons with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus.
2 8
The plain language of this section prohibits all forms of employment-
related discrimination against health care professionals. Although the
term "health care professional" is undefined, it probably should be
225. Id. § 768.28(2).
226. For a summary of Florida governmental immunity law, see supra notes 206-09 and ac-
companying text.
227. See ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2030 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
228. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(d) (Supp. 1988)).
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given a plain-language meaning, i.e., any licensed worker who treats
or is perceived as treating one or more persons with HIV infection or
its related illnesses.
One problem with this provision, however, is the use of the word
"professional." At common law the term meant only doctors, law-
yers, teachers and clergy. 229 This definition was not intended by the
Legislature since it effectively would extend protection only to doc-
tors.
The Florida Supreme Court recently modified the term "profes-
sional" to mean a person practicing a vocation that requires at a mini-
mum a four-year college degree. 230 However, this definition also is
problematic in that some health care workers can be licensed without
a four-year degree, 23 1 and may not fall within this definition. Such a
result conflicts with the legislative intent, which is to protect all li-
censed health care workers who treat AIDS patients.
23 2
The term "professional" should be construed to mean "profes-
sional or worker." That is, the protections of this provision should
extend to any health care worker whose job requires a license from the
state, whether or not the license requires a four-year degree. The 1989
Legislature should take action to ensure that all health care workers
are covered by this section, which could be achieved by specifying that
the protection also applies to "licensed health care workers."
Finally, this provision of the Omnibus AIDS Act applies to employ-
ment discrimination-not to other forms of discrimination. Thus, it
would be permissible to discriminate in the leasing of office space to
health care workers, 233 but not in the employment decisions made in
that office, if those decisions were based on HIV-related concerns.
The 1989 Legislature should extend the protections afforded by this
section to all other matters important to the establishment and opera-
tion of health care facilities treating HIV-infected patients. 234
229. See Pierce v. AALL Ins., Inc., 531 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 1988).
230. Id.
231. For instance, midwives may be licensed with only two or three years of training. FLA.
STAT. § 467.009 (1987).
232. The Legislature did not have the benefit of the Pierce definition of the term "profes-
sional" when it passed the Omnibus AIDS Act because Pierce was not published until July 14,
1988, more than a month after the 1988 session ended.
233. This issue arose, for instance, in Seitzman v. Hudson River Assoc., 126 A.D.2d 211,
513 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 1987).
234. This could be achieved by adding a new section to read:
No person may fail or refuse to sell, rent, lease or transfer, or fail or refuse to offer
for sale, rent lease or transfer, any interest or estate in real property solely on the fact
or belief that the potential transferee is the agent of, or is, a licensed health care
worker who will or may use the real property in question in the treatment of persons
infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus.
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H. Enforcement Provisions
Although the holding in Shuttleworth remains enforceable only un-
der the administrative procedure set forth in the Human Rights Act, z"5
each of the new HIV-related nondiscrimination provisions can be en-
forced by a civil action brought directly in circuit court. 2 6 Each al-
leged violation of any of the provisions constitutes a separate act
supporting a separate claim for damages.237
On the question of damages, the plaintiff has several options. First
he or she can sue for liquidated damages of $1,000 per violation, or
$5,000 where the discriminatory act was intentionally or recklessly
committed. 238 Second, he or she can sue for actual damages if they are
in excess of the appropriate liquidated amount. 23 9 In addition, the pre-
vailing plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and such other
relief as the court may deem proper, without limit, including an in-
junction.2 40 Under this last provision, it appears that punitive damages
also will be available in appropriate cases.
Finally, the Omnibus AIDS Act specifies that remedies provided in
the nondiscrimination section are to be in addition to any other dam-
ages available under applicable law.2 4' Thus, the nondiscrimination
section is not to be deemed the exclusive remedy available at law for
people alleging HIV-related discrimination. For example, a plaintiff
simultaneously could pursue relief under the handicap clause of the
Florida Constitution,2 42 the Human Rights Act,2 43 the Fair Housing
Act244 and the Omnibus AIDS Act, if the facts warranted it.
II. HIV INFECTION AS A NoN-MATERIAL FACT IN REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS
In a separate civil rights provision, the Omnibus AIDS Act provides
that the fact that an occupant of real property is infected with HIV or
diagnosed with AIDS "is not a material fact that must be disclosed in
a real estate transaction. ' ' 245 This section further specifies that no
235. FLA. STAT. § 760.10 (1987).






241. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
242. FLA. CONST. art I, § 2.
243. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-.10 (1987).
244. Id. §§ 760.20-.37.
245. Ch. 88-380, § 46, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2031 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 689.25(1) (Supp.
1988)).
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cause of action arises for failure to disclose such information to the
transferee of the property.
246
This section did not appear in either the original House or Senate
drafts. It seems to have been a reaction to events in Texas, where at-
torneys had advised the state board of realtors that they must disclose
a prior occupant's HIV infection to potential transferees. 247 Although
not actually a part of the new nondiscrimination provisions and not
enforceable under them, this provision probably should be read as
resting on the same fundamental policies.
24
1
Finally, one potential objection to this section is that it may violate
Florida's constitutional guarantee of access to the courts. 249 Interpret-
ing this guarantee, the Florida Supreme Court has held that the Legis-
lature has only limited authority to abolish a preexisting cause of
action. 250 However, this objection appears meritless in this instance.
This section of the Omnibus AIDS Act does not abolish an entire
cause of action: it merely declares that there can be no injury for non-
disclosure of specific HIV-related information in real estate transac-
tions. Since this conclusion is supported by all available scientific
evidence, 25' the courts most likely will uphold this section as a valid
exercise of the Legislature's authority to prohibit unfair discrimina-
tion.
III. INSURANCE
The next major group of nondiscrimination provisions added to
Florida law in 1988 deals with insurance. 25 2 Prior to the Omnibus
AIDS Act, Florida law placed no restriction on the use of HIV-related
information in life and health insurance underwriting. Pursuant to its
authority to regulate the insurance industry, the Florida Department
of Insurance on January 28, 1988, approved new rules forbidding
246. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 689.25(2) (Supp. 1988)).
247. Taylor, IsHavingAIDS a 'Material Fact'?, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 28, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
248. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
249. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
250. E.g., Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
251. HIV cannot be casually transmitted, but must actually be introduced into the body of a
person for infection to occur. This can be by an exchange of fluids during sex, intravenous drug
use or from mother to infant. AIDS UPDATE 1988, supra note 3, at 42-44. Accord ch. 88-380, §
1, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 1998 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.607 (Supp. 1988)).
252. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 1031 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429 (Supp.
1988)); id. § 48, 1988 Fla. Laws at 3034 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.411 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 49,
1988 Fla. Laws at 2035 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.6265 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 50, 1988 Fla.
Laws at 2035 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.6646 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 51, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2035
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 641.3007) (Supp. 1988)); id. § 52, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2037 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 641.31(3)(b) (1987)).
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many forms of HIV-related discrimination. 23 However, these rules ef-
fectively were rendered moot by the Omnibus AIDS Act and now are
awaiting repeal and replacement by the agency.
254
Using these rules as a starting point, the 1988 Legislature made a
conscious decision to impose severe limits on discriminatory practices,
and adopted a substantial addition to state insurance law. With some
notable exceptions, it forbids the use of information about a person's
HIV status or sexual orientation in underwriting life and health insur-
ance policies.
The policies underlying the insurance sections are the same as those
underlying other nondiscrimination provisions. Throughout the 1988
session, the primary drafters of these provisions stated that they are
meant to create an environment in which people will not be afraid to
be honest about their HIV status, and to allow people to remain pro-
ductive in society for as long as possible. One method of accomplish-
ing these goals is by forbidding insurers from discriminating against
HIV-related infections in ways not done for other serious illnesses.
As Representative Frankel noted, the loss of insurance and employ-
ment will only turn HIV-infected people into public wards. 25 With
tens of thousands of Floridians expected to become HIV infected by
the 1990s, 216 the Legislature must find the most acceptable method of
distributing the overall cost equitably among society. One method is
by requiring that HIV infection be treated for insurance purposes the
same as any other major illness, thus preventing at least some of the
ill from becoming destitute and seeking state assistance. The Legisla-
ture said that "The purpose of this section is to prohibit unfair prac-
tices in the indemnity of life and health insurance with respect to
exposure to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection and related
matters, and thereby reduce the possibility that a person may suffer
unfair discrimination when purchasing life and health insurance. ' 25 7
A substantially similar statement of purpose is contained in a separate
provision dealing with health maintenance organizations.2 5
These statements and their legislative history will guide statutory
construction. On that basis, it appears that the insurance provisions
253. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 4-76 (Jan. 28, 1988). Because these rules are now moot, they will
likely be repealed by the Department of Insurance.
254. Memorandum from Cynthia Fuller, Fla. Dep't of Ins., to Craig Waters (Aug. 1, 1988)
(copy on file, Florida State University Law Review).
255. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
257. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2035 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(1) (Supp.
1988)).
258. Id. § 51, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2035 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 641.3109(1) (Supp. 1988)).
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have the same broad and remedial purposes that underlie the nondis-





A. Life and Health Insurance Policies
The Omnibus AIDS Act includes several new provisions regarding
life and health insurance policies. These provisions restrict the use of
HIV-related tests and prohibit consideration of sexual orientation in
underwriting policies, impose confidentiality requirements, limit the
use of exclusion clauses, and forbid cancellation or nonrenewal of
policies because the insured has been diagnosed or treated for HIV-
related illnesses.
1. HIV-Related Testing
The Omnibus AIDS Act imposes new restrictions on the use of
HIV-related tests in underwriting any life and health insurance policy
and multiple employer welfare arrangements (MEWAs). 260 Insurers
are allowed to require HIV testing only in two instances: (1) when
"based on the person's current medical condition or medical history;"
or (2) when testing is "triggered by threshold coverage amounts which
apply to all persons within the risk class. "261
The first of these categories is somewhat vague, presenting a prob-
lem for statutory construction. Under the broad phrases "medical
condition" and "medical history," insurers could decide to test a per-
son based on any medical condition found in that person's medical
history, whether or not it is a likely indicator of HIV infection. Such
an interpretation would condone the use of pretexts in requiring HIV-
related tests, rendering this provision meaningless. This construction
should not be favored since the courts are required to presume that
every provision of a statute has a purpose, if possible.
262
It seems more likely that the Legislature only intended to permit
this kind of testing when a medical condition or the medical history
discloses a factor likely to indicate exposure to HIV. For instance, a
history of infection with other sexually transmissible diseases or a
prior diagnosis of Kaposi's sarcoma or Pneumocystis carinii pneumo-
nia would indicate a likelihood of exposure to HIV.
259. See supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
260. See FLA. STAT. § 624.437 (1987).
261. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2032 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(d)
(Supp. 1988)).
262. Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960).
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The second category is also somewhat vague, especially the phrase
"all persons within the risk class." However, the apparent meaning of
this provision is that an insurer can require HIV tests only if every
person applying for the specific amount and type of coverage in ques-
tion is required to take such tests. This construction of the statute is
consistent with the legislative purpose, as it requires every similarly
situated person to be treated the same way without regard to possible
HIV infection.
The Omnibus AIDS Act specifies that the insurer may only use tests
deemed to be "reliable predictors of risk. ' 263 This term means that the
test is recommended by the CDC or by the federal Food and Drug
Administration. 264 However, if the test used indicates a positive result,
the insurer still must follow any recommended protocol for follow-up
testing. Under current medical practice, this would mean that a posi-
tive test result from the widely used and relatively inexpensive En-
zyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) test must be followed
up with another ELISA test; and if this second test is positive, an
additional more expensive test called the Western blot is recom-
mended .265
The Act also specifies certain procedures that must be followed
whenever an insurer tests for HIV exposure. Prior to testing, the in-
surer must disclose its intent to test for HIV infection or for any spe-
cific illness related to such infection. 266 The person seeking insurance
must execute a written informed consent form that includes a "fair
explanation of the test, including its purpose, potential uses, and limi-
tations, and the meaning of its results and the right to confidential
treatment of information. ' 267 An insurer obtains a conclusive pre-
sumption of informed consent if it uses a form approved by the De-
partment of Insurance.
261
Results must be communicated to a person testing positive by a
physician designated by the applicant or, if none, by the Department
263. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 3032 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(a)
(Supp. 1988)).
264. Id.
265. MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 42-43.
266. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2032 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
267. Id.
268. Id. The term "the department" is not defined in this section, but it must refer to the
Department of Insurance. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the same section specifi-
cally refers to the "Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services" by its full name. Since the
only two agencies logically involved in this question are these two, the undefined term should be
construed to mean the Department of Insurance.
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of Health and Rehabilitative Services. 269 The designee then must pro-
vide: (1) face-to-face counseling with the applicant regarding the
meaning of the test results, the possible need for additional testing,
and the need to eliminate behaviors that may spread HIV to others;
(2) the availability of nearby health-care services, including mental
health care and social and support services; (3) the benefits of notify-
ing prior sexual partners and others who may have been exposed to
HIV by the applicant; and (4) the availability of public assistance to
help locate such people.
270
2. Sexual Orientation
The Act expressly forbids the consideration of a person's sexual ori-
entation in the underwriting process or in determining whether an ap-
plicant will be tested for HIV infection. 271 To this end, the following
factors may not be considered if they are meant to determine sexual
orientation: marital status, living arrangements, occupation, gender,
designation of beneficiary, zip code or any other territorial classifica-
tion.
2 72
Since the term "sexual orientation" is not defined in the Omnibus
AIDS Act it presents a problem of construction, since it is possible to
construe it broadly to encompass a wide range of activities relating to
gender identity or sexuality. Since the Legislature's evident purpose is
to prevent discrimination against those believed to be homosexual or
bisexual, two groups generally perceived to be at high risk for HIV
infection, the Omnibus AIDS Act must preclude favorable treatment
for those believed to be heterosexual.
By prohibiting the use of information from which sexual orienta-
tion might be inferred, 273 the Omnibus AIDS Act forbids insurers
from even conjecturing on this question, making the perception of
sexual orientation equally impermissible in insurance-related deci-
sions. Therefore "sexual orientation" should mean the fact or percep-
tion that a person is oriented toward men, women, or both in matters
of personal intimacy. Such a construction is consistent with the stated
legislative purpose of preventing unfair discrimination against those
suspected of carrying HIV.
269. Id. § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws at 3032 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(c) (Supp. 1988)).
270. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(c)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1988)).
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3. Inquiries About Knowledge of HIV Exposure
The Act allows insurers to ask applicants if they have tested positive
for exposure to HIV or have been diagnosed with either AIDS, ARC
or any other HIV-related infection.2 74 However, insurers are not per-
mitted to ask whether a person has taken a test or has tested negative
for HIV exposure or any HIV-related illness.2 75 The apparent purpose
was to allow insurers to obtain information about preexisting condi-
tions known to the applicant, but to forbid them from eliciting infor-
mation tending to show that a person feared he or she was at risk for
HIV infection.
4. Confidentiality and Industry Data Banks
Under the insurance provisions, insurers are required to keep all
HIV-related information they obtain about applicants in strictest con-
fidence. 276 Such information cannot be disclosed outside the insurance
company, insurance affiliates, agents or reinsurers, except to the per-
son who has been tested.2 77 Moreover, specific test results cannot be
given to industry data banks in any form that would permit the iden-




No health insurance policy can exclude or limit coverage for expo-
sure to HIV infection or any related illness "except as provided in a
preexisting condition clause."2 79 The exception presents a problem for
construction, in that a preexisting condition conceivably could include
an undiscovered asymptomatic preexisting condition; and a preexist-
ing condition clause conceivably could be written so as to deny cover-
age if the insured had any reason to believe he or she had been
exposed to HIV.
This interpretation, however, would allow the exception to swallow
the rule and would render the insurance provisions meaningless by
permitting insurance companies to deny coverage for HIV infection in
ways not applicable to other illnesses. Thus, to give effect to this pro-
vision, the preexisting condition must have been known or manifest to
274. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(e) (Supp. 1988)).
275. Id.
276. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(0 (Supp. 1988)).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
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the insured. 2 0 The Legislature clearly did not intend to permit insurers
to disallow coverage for a preexisting, albeit asymptomatic, HIV in-
fection where the insured had little or no reason to believe that he or
she was infected. 28'1 The 1989 Legislature should take action to define
the term "preexisting condition" so that it cannot be expansively con-
strued.
(a) Group Policies
The Omnibus AIDS Act significantly limits the types of exclusions
that can be included in group insurance policies. It forbids insurers
from excluding coverage of an eligible individual in a group policy
"because of a positive test result for exposure to the HIV infection or
a specific sickness or medical condition derived from such expo-
sure." ' 212 It is irrelevant whether the test or illness occurred before or
after the policy went into force. However, the statute expressly pro-
vides that this restriction will not apply "to individuals applying for
coverage where individual underwriting is otherwise allowed by
law.' '283
(b) Individual Policies
At the urging of insurers, the Senate inserted a provision allowing
individual policies to contain a limited exclusion clause dealing with
HIV-related illnesses. 28 The effect is that individual policies may ex-
clude coverage for AIDS or ARC if objective manifestations of AIDS
or ARC, as those terms are defined by the CDC, are first exhibited
280. This conclusion is consistent with prior case law. E.g., American Sun Life Ins. Co. v.
Remig, 482 So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co. v. Sande, 421 So.
2d 566, 568-69 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). However, these cases hinged at least in part on insurance
contract language.
281. The comments of Representative Frankel, quoted supra, note 107, support this conclu-
sion. Moreover, the Omnibus AIDS Act clearly prohibits certain inquiries of the insured de-
signed to determine whether he or she might be at risk for HIV exposure, such as questions
about sexual orientation and whether the individual has tested negative. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988
Fla. Laws 1996, 2033 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
282. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2033 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(a)
(Supp. 1988)).
283. Id.
284. The provision was added into the bill on the floor of the Senate on May 31, 1988, by
Senator Myers, who expressly noted that this was the Golden Rule provision. Fla. S., transcript
of proceedings at 15-16 (May 31, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review)
(comments of Sen. Myers). It was so named because the provision was first suggested by a repre-
sentative of the Golden Rule Insurance Co. on April 7. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care,
transcript of hearing at 45-47 (Apr. 7, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University Law
Review) (comments of Maria Randolph Stevens).
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within a year of the policy -taking effect. 285 The exclusion will not ap-
ply if the insured merely learns he or she is HIV-infected. 216 Moreover,
the manifestations of AIDS or ARC must be "objective" and can be
established only by the "opinion of a legally qualified physician."
2 7
One problem with this provision is its requirement that the manifes-
tations must be in keeping with CDC definitions of AIDS and ARC.
ARC especially is a problem, since the CDC has not defined it.288 The
CDC might not do so, since many symptoms previously considered to
fall under ARC are included in the 1987 revised Case Definition of
AIDS.28 9 Thus, the reference to ARC in this provision is meaningless,
since the term is incapable of definition under the statute's own terms.
Furthermore, the CDC definition of AIDS is quite complicated,
usually involving numerous tests and the elimination of other poten-
tial explanations for immune deficiency9m In some instances, the
CDC does not permit diagnosis of AIDS if an individual happens to
develop certain AIDS-associated symptoms that are improperly diag-
nosed and confirmed. Therefore, a person may develop "objective
manifestations" that nevertheless would not presently qualify as
AIDS under the CDC definition. However, since the statute in ques-
tion does not specify when the CDC definition must be met, 291 any
manifestations appearing within the first year probably can be con-
firmed at a later date. It would be irrelevant that confirmation of
AIDS occurred after the year limitation expired, so long as the mani-
festations first were observed by the physician within the first year.
Policies containing this exclusion also must meet certain conditions.
First, the insurer may not require a test for HIV infection as a condi-
tion of issuing the policy. 292 This limitation was included because at
least one insurance company stated that without the exclusion it
would begin testing everyone applying for individual policies. 293 Sec-
ond, the exclusion clause must be set forth separately, with an appro-
priate caption, placed conspicuously on the policy data page, and




288. See Fla. S., Comm. on HRS, transcript of hearing at 14-16 (May 3, 1988) (transcript on
file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Gary Clarke of HRS).
289. See supra note 159.
290. Id.
291. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2034 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(d)
(Supp. 1988)).
292. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
293. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 46 (Apr. 7, 1988) (transcript
on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Maria Randolph Stevens).
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must contain a statement that the exclusion will lapse if the insurer
fails to assert it within two years of the policy taking effect. 294 Third,
if the exclusion is to be applied, the insurer must give notice to the
insured within ninety days of learning of the latter's HIV-related con-
dition. 291 Otherwise, the insurer will be barred from asserting the ex-
clusion.296 Finally, the policy must cover all AIDS- and ARC-related
conditions that objectively manifest themselves more than a year after
the policy takes effect.
297
One problem of construction posed by this section arises from the
requirement that objective manifestation be determined by "a legally
qualified physician. ' 29 The Omnibus AIDS Act does not specify what
happens if the opinion of one physician is challenged by that of an-
other. To prevent potential abuse, the courts should treat this as they
would any disputed factual question. That is, the question of whether
an objective manifestation of AIDS or ARC occurred would be a
question of fact to be resolved by the fact finder. Thus, where one
physician says that such an objective manifestation occurred, that
opinion will not be conclusive where another physician says it did not.
(c) Life Insurance Policies
Life insurance policies may not exclude coverage based on death
either directly or indirectly caused by HIV infection or related ill-
nesses. 299 However, insurers are permitted to exclude coverage for pre-
existing conditions. 3°° The term "preexisting condition" should not be
construed to mean an unknown, unmanifested preexisting condition;
nor should it be construed to permit insurers to disallow coverage
based on the likelihood that the insured has been exposed, though cur-
rently asymptomatic.3 01 Thus, the policy would not cover death be-
cause of HIV-related illnesses that occurred within the specified
exclusion period after the policy took effect, provided the insured
knew he or she was HIV infected. Finally, this provision does not ap-
ply to policies insuring for accidents only.302
294. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2034 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(d)(2)
(Supp. 1988)).
295. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(d)(3) (Supp. 1988)).
296. Id.
297. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(d)(4) (Supp. 1988)).
298. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(d) (Supp. 1988)).
299. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(c) (Supp. 1988)).
300. Id.
301. See supra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
302. Ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2033 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
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(d) Limiting Benefits Payable for HIV-Related Illnesses
In a provision relating to the kinds of insurance forms that can be
approved for use in Florida, the Omnibus AIDS Act forbids any
clause that excludes coverage for HIV infection or AIDS or that treats
these illnesses differently from other sicknesses or medical condi-
tions. 3°0 This section is inconsistent with the exception for individual
policies noted above.3°4 However, in such cases, Florida courts gener-
ally construe the specific statute to be an exception to the more gen-
eral one. 05 Thus, this'provision should apply in all instances except
where an individual policy excludes coverage for HIV-related illnesses
when a person objectively manifests AIDS or ARC within a year of
coverage.
(e) Cancellation and Nonrenewal Based on HIV Infection
In its final major restriction on insurance policies, the Omnibus
AIDS Act forbids the cancellation or nonrenewal of a policy because
of the diagnosis or treatment of HIV-related illnesses.3°6 The Legisla-
ture added this restriction both to the portion of the insurance code
dealing with health insurance policies30 7 and to the portion dealing
with group or blanket health insurance policies.30 8 The legislative his-
tory indicates that this provision was patterned after a similar law
adopted by the West Virginia Legislature. 309
B. Health Maintenance Organizations
In a separate section of the Omnibus AIDS Act, the Legislature
placed virtually the same limitations on HMOs that now apply to
health and life insurance policies and MEWAs. 10 The only major di-
vergence is that there is no provision for HMOs under any circum-
303. Id. § 48, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2035 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.411(1)(f) (1987)).
304. See id. § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2033-34 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429(5) (Supp.
1988)).
305. See supra note 30.
306. Ch. 88-380, § 49, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2035 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.6265 (Supp.
1988)); id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.6646 (Supp. 1988)).
307. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.6057-.6498 (1987).
308. Id. §§ 627.651-.6698.
309. House Staff Analyst Tom Cooper stated: "Section[s] 47 and 48 [are] patterned after a
law that was passed in West Virginia, which prohibits the canceling or non-renewal of insurance
policies, health insurance policies of any insured because of a diagnosis of HIV or AIDS." Fla.
H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 68 (Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Tom Cooper).
310. Ch. 88-380, § 51, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2035-37 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 641.3109
(Supp. 1988)); id. § 52, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2037-38 (amending FLA. STAT. § 641.31 (1987)).
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stance to exclude coverage where the insured objectively manifests
symptoms of AIDS or ARC within a year of coverage. 1'
The section on HMOs, however, includes a garbled sentence in the
provision dealing with HIV-related testing. It provides that "no health
maintenance organization shall only utilize medical tests which are re-
liable predictors of risk. ' '1 ' 2 In the original House draft, the sentence
read "health maintenance organizations may only utilize medical tests
which are reliable predictors of risk." 3 3 The sentence became inexpli-
cably garbled during the House-Senate compromise.
However, this provision should be read in pari materia with the sec-
tion dealing with health and life insurance and MEWAs,3 1 4 and the
favored construction should be to ignore the word "no," changing
the phrase "health maintenance organization" to the plural. The sen-
tence should read "health maintenance organizations shall only utilize
medical tests which are reliable predictors of risk."
IV. TIE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION PROVISIONS
Even before the opening day of the 1988 session, the most contro-
versial components of the Omnibus AIDS Act proved to be those
dealing with quarantine and isolation.3 15 One lobbyist noted that the
press focused almost exclusively on the quarantine issue in reports on
early drafts of the Omnibus AIDS Act.116 The Governor called for an
311. This is the Golden Rule provision. See supra notes 284-87 and accompanying text.
312. Ch. 88-380, § 51, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2036 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.6646(4)(a)
(Supp. 1988)) (emphasis added).
313. Fla. CS for HB 1519, § 95, at 88-89 (1988) (First Engrossed).
314. See ch. 88-380, § 47, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2031 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.429
(Supp. 1988)).
315. The wording of preexisting law indicates that the terms "quarantine" and "isolation"
as used in this context have special meanings. "Quarantine" means making certain places off
limits, while "isolation" refers to ordering a person to remain in a certain location, so that
disease will not be spread. See Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 49
(Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Tom
Cooper) ("Quarantine is an action that is taken against a place, not a person."). The Omnibus
AIDS Act replaces the term "made off limits" for "quarantined" and deletes all other refer-
ences to "quarantine." However, this Article will continue to use the term "quarantine" to refer
to the act of making a place off limits.
316. Lobbyist Charlene Carres, representing the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Florida Task Force, stated:
I just wanted to make one-one comment on-on the idea that there is an omnibus
AIDS bill this year, coming up. And that's been a problem that was created by the
publicity that-that started in like mid-January on the fact that Florida is considering
some sort of horrible quarantine bill that's going to round up gay people. That's the
way this idea has been presented in the press all the way from The New York Times to
the Tallahassee Democrat this morning.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 89 (Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Charlene Carres).
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overhauled AIDS-related quarantine system in his opening address to
the Legislature on April 5, 1988, prompting some criticism from lob-
byists and legislators.317 The Governor asked for the refurbishing of a
state tuberculosis hospital at Lantana in which up to twenty-six indivi-
duals with sexually transmissible diseases could be isolated.',
Reacting to the Governor's statements, spokesmen for civil liberties
groups strongly urged the Legislature to abandon quarantine alto-
gether because of its potential for abuse. 19 They often cited a 1987
case in Pensacola, Florida, in which a juvenile judge summarily con-
fined a fourteen-year-old boy infected with HIV to a county mental
health unit because of his infection and perceived promiscuity.320
However, proponents of quarantine argued that the incident in Pensa-
cola only pointed out the need for reform of state statutes, not their
abolition.3 2' Legislators embraced reform over abolition with near
unanimity.3 22 The issue became not whether there would be a quaran-
tine law, but its form and constitutionality.3 23 Both House and Senate
317. See Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 37-39 (Feb. 29, 1988)
(comments of Charlene Carres); id at 41 (comments of Rep. Gordon); id. at 42 (comments of
Rep. Frankel). See also Should We Quarantine Those Who Spread AIDS?, Miami Herald, Apr.
10, 1988, at IC, cols. 1-4 (guest articles by Gov. Bob Martinez and Rep. Lois Frankel).
318. See Should We Quarantine Those Who Spred AIDS?, supra note 317, at IC, cols. 1-4.
319. Prior to the session and the governor's opening-day remarks, South Florida gay activist
Bob Kunst stated that 'quarantine'. . . is a scare word and that will move the entire process
backwards in terms of anyone out there cooperating on any level, from testing on down. This is
not the way to trade off whatever you need to pass. This is absolutely the worst thing you could
do." Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 82-83 (Feb. 29, 1988) (tran-
script on file, Florida State University Law Review) (testimony of Bob Kunst).
320. Quarantine Indication of 'Hysteria,' Pensacola News J., June 12, 1987, at IA, col. 2
(detailing quarantine of a 14-year-old in a county mental health hospital).
321. See infra notes 334-36.
322. See generally Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing (Apr. 7, 1988)
(transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of various representatives).
323. Florida has recognized the validity of quarantine measures. Moore v. Armstrong, 149
So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1963); Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla.
571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943). Legal and medical commentators, however, almost uniformly argue
that quarantine is useless against a "slow" retrovirus like HIV, which manifests no symptoms in
the host for many years. MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 176; Curran, Clark & Gostin,
AIDS: Legal and Policy Implications of the Application of Traditional Disease Control Meas-
ures, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 27, 33 (1987); Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival
of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53, 87-90 (1985); Note, The Constitutional Rights
of AIDS Carriers, 99 HAv. L. REv. 1274, 1292 (1986); Note, AIDS Quarantine in England and
the United States, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 113, 156-57 (1986); Note, Recent Devel-
opments: Public Health and Employment Issues Generated by the AIDS Crisis, 25 WASHBURN
L.J. 505, 534 (1986). For a general history of quarantine, see Petteway, Compulsory Quarantine
and Treatment of Persons Infected with Venereal Diseases, 18 FLA. L.J. 13 (1944); Cowles, State
Quarantine Laws and the Federal Constitution, 25 AM. L. REV. 45 (1889). However, the Presi-
dential Commission has endorsed a limited isolation procedure for people who refuse to stop
infecting others. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 77.
OMNIBUS AIDS ACT
and the state's health administrators played a substantial role in re-
solving that issue.
A. General Legislative History
The compromise reached on the quarantine and isolation provisions
supplemented a prior reform of state law that was only two years old.
In 1986, as part of its massive overhaul of the state's health services
programs,3 24 the Legislature enacted the Control of Sexually Trans-
missible Disease Act of 1986 (1986 Act). 25 The 1986 Act superseded a
1919 quarantine statute326 that rested on the flimsiest of constitutional
footings. 27 Indeed, the 1919 statute as later amended purported to al-
low local health officials or their deputies to confine persons sus-
pected of having venereal disease without a court hearing,3 28 but
apparently the 1919 quarantine statute was seldom used in this way.
3 29
Perhaps hoping to correct the 1919 statute's constitutional inade-
quacies, °30 the 1986 Legislature enacted a new quarantine and isolation
provision that provided for a court hearing and a standard of proof.
Specifically, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
(HRS) was authorized to petition a court for an isolation or quaran-
tine order. To obtain the order, HRS had to show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that a substantial threat to the public health existed
and that no less restrictive alternative existed other than quarantine or
isolation. " ' At the same time, the 1986 Act provided that a person
suspected of being infected with a sexually transmissible disease could
be coercively examined and treated upon a court warrant.3 2 The De-
324. Ch. 86-220, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603 (codified at scattered sections of FLA. STAT. (Supp.
1986)).
325. FLA. STAT. §§ 384.21-.34 (1987).
326. See ch. 7829, Laws of Fla. (1919).
327. Generally it is conceded that the state has the power to quarantine. See Gray, The Para-
meters of Mandat6ry Public Health Measures and the AIDS Epidemic, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv.
505, 510-16 (1986) (discussing court opinions that generally uphold quarantines).
328. See FLA. STAT. §§ 384.14-.17 (1985).
329. Gary Clarke of HRS indicated that he knew of no instance in recent years in which an
isolation order was obtained except the incident in Pensacola, Florida. Fla. H.R., Comm. on
Health Care, transcript of hearing at 50 (Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State Univer-
sity Law Review) (comments of Gary Clarke).
330. The 1919 statute, taken literally, probably would have been held unconstitutional even
under state law. See, e.g., In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977) (civil commitment proceed-
ings must operate under the clear and convincing standard of proof, which necessarily entails a
court hearing).
331. FLA. STAT. § 384.28 (1987).
332. Id. This power apparently never was tested in any court proceeding. During the 1988
Legislature, administrators from HRS indicated that it was used perhaps only five times a year
to detain, examine and treat people carrying venereal diseases such as syphilis. Fla. H.R.,
Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 50 (Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida
State University Law Review) (comments of Gary Clarke).
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partment could obtain the warrant by showing, with a preponderance
of the evidence, that a threat to public health existed.33
The 1986 Act's first application in the case of the fourteen-year-old
Pensacola, Florida, boy created a controversy reported in the media
nationwide 3 4 Indeed, HRS administrators in Tallahassee found them-
selves in the embarrassing position of countermanding their own local
officers and requesting the Pensacola court to dissolve its isolation or-
der against the boy.335 The Pensacola case taught HRS that something
more was needed to restrain the acts of local officials and to keep
Florida's AIDS-related health programs from being overridden by
controversy. 336
For its answer, HRS turned to a package of additions to the 1986
Act lumped under a general heading of "due process." '337 In early
February 1988, HRS released a draft of legislation it proposed for the
upcoming session containing its new "due process" requirements.
338
The centerpiece of the draft3 9 was an extensive series of additions to
the 1986 Act. With technical modifications and the addition of several
other procedural safeguards, the HRS quarantine and isolation pro-
posal ultimately became a part of the Omnibus AIDS Act as signed
into law.
333. FLA. STAT. § 384.28 (1987).
334. See Quarantine Indication of 'Hysteria', Pensacola News J., June 12, 1987, at IA, col.
2. Gary Clarke, HRS spokesman, suggested that the incident in Pensacola was one of several in
which local officials erroneously applied the short-term hold procedures to cases that should
have been treated under an isolation order. Clarke stated:
What's turned out in a couple of cases around the state, either proposed or actual, is
the examination and treatment language which we were intending to be short-term has
actually been used for proposed long-term hospitalization. And really, in order to
clarify our intent, which was to use a higher standard when confinement was for a
longer period of time, we recommended doing both. The other thing that we consid-
ered is that, when it becomes-when it comes to trial or becomes a hearing-is the
clear and convincing standard and preponderance-it's very difficult to say which is
which. And we felt that at least as a department we should be held to that higher
burden.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 48 (Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Gary Clarke).
335. See Sexually Active Youth with AIDS Escapes Parental Custody, Tallahassee Demo-
crat, June 12, 1988, at 7D, col. 1.
336. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 50-51 (Feb. 29, 1988) (tran-
script on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Gary Clarke of HRS).
337. See id. at 65 (Apr. 7, 1988) (comments of Gary Clarke).
338. Fla. Dep't of HRS, Comprehensive Legislation Related To: Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (draft of Feb. 1988) (draft on file, Florida State University Law Review).
339. The draft also included an educational program, authorization for patient care net-
works and some modifications to criminal code provisions dealing with sexual acts. It contained
no nondiscrimination provisions nor any of the extensive testing and confidentiality restrictions
found in the Omnibus AIDS Act signed by the governor, essentially additions by the House.
Compare id. with Fla. C.S. for H.B. 1519 (1988) (First Engrossed).
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Legislators repeatedly noted that these would be of very limited ap-
plication in Florida. Explaining the bill to the full House on May 10,
Representative Frankel argued that the isolation provisions were to be
reserved for "those extreme cases, where those persons who, despite
our best attempts to . give them education and counseling-We do
allow . . . with . . much due process, a procedure . . . for isolation
for short periods of time." 3"4 In an interview shortly after the session
ended, Representative Frankel argued that the behavior resulting in an
isolation order would have to reach such a level as to be virtually
chargeable as a criminal offense.
341
During committee hearings early in the session, Representative
Elaine Gordon,3 4 2 one of the House bill's primary sponsors, stated
that the isolation provisions must not be used to isolate individuals
simply because of sexual orientation, intravenous drug abuse, or even
for any behavior that did not pose a "wanton threat to the public.
3 a43
An HRS representative, Gary Clarke, agreed and added that isolation
would only be appropriate in "very limited, egregious, notorious
cases." 4 This conclusion is reinforced by other legislative history
3 45
and the language added to the state's sexually transmissible diseases
law by the Omnibus AIDS Act.
B. Isolation and Examination of Individuals
The Omnibus AIDS Act provides that HRS will bear a greater bur-
den of proof when seeking the isolation or compulsory examination of
persons carrying sexually transmissible diseases.
340. Fla. H.R., transcript of proceedings at 5 (May 10, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida
State University Law Review).
341. Interview with Rep. Frankel (June 21, 1988) (notes on file, Florida State University Law
Review).
342. Dem., North Miami.
343. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 41 (Apr. 7, 1988) (transcript
on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Gordon).
344. Id. at 61 (comments of Gary Clarke).
345. During the House AIDS Task Force meeting on April 7, Representative Frankel stated:
[W]e do recognize there's going to be a small segment, and a very small segment, of
our society who-uh-we call noncompliant carriers. They're criminals. There is a
criminal element in every area of life. And for those people we do have a provision in
our bill to treat them in a just and fair way, and with due process, but recognizing that
there will be some people who conventional means cannot be controlled. But we don't
emphasize that part of our bill, because anybody who believes that locking up 20 pros-
titutes is going to solve the AIDS problem is quite mistaken, because I can assure you
that the million and a half people who are infected in this country are not prostitutes.
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 3-4 (Apr. 7, 1988) (transcript on
File, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel) (emphasis added).
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1. Compulsory Isolation
One new element of proof is imposed on compulsory isolation peti-
tions. In addition to proving a significant threat to public health and
no less restrictive means other than isolation, HRS must now show the
court:
That the person with the sexually transmissible disease has been
counseled about the disease, about the significant threat the disease
poses to other members of the public, and about methods to
minimize the risk to the public and despite such counseling indicates
an intent to expose the public to infection from the sexually
transmissible disease.? 6
This provision requires HRS to attempt noncoercive intervention and
counseling prior to seeking an isolation order, and requires HRS to
present proof that the individual actually intends to engage in behav-
ior likely to transmit the disease, which will be virtually impossible in
all but a few cases.
To further protect civil liberties, the Legislature added a number of
procedural requirements. The isolation hearing must be held no earlier
than seventy-two hours after the individual has received written notifi-
cation, and HRS must submit a list of the proposed actions HRS in-
tends to take and the reasons for each one. The individual, whose real
name may not be used during the proceedings, also must be provided
an attorney at the state's expense if he or she is unable to afford one.
At the hearing, the individual has a right to be present, to cross-exam-
ine witnesses and to present evidence. Finally, each isolation order can
last no longer than 120 days, or a shorter time if HRS or the court
determines that the individual no longer poses a threat to the commu-
nity. The individual subject to isolation has an explicit right to peti-
tion for the length of time to be less than the full 120 days.3 47
2. Compulsory Examination and Treatment
The Omnibus AIDS Act substantially modifies HRS's statutory au-
thorization to conduct compulsory examinations and treatment of
people suspected of carrying sexually transmissible diseases.
31 8 Most
importantly, the Legislature raised HRS's burden of proof for obtain-
346. Ch. 88-380, § 30, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2018 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.28(2)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
347. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 348.28(4) (Supp. 1988)).
348. Id. § 29, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2017-18 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.27 (Supp. 1988)).
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ing a compulsory examination order to require clear and convincing
evidence that a threat to the public health and welfare exists.
3 49
Tracking some of the language applicable to isolation orders, the
Omnibus AIDS Act also requires that a court hearing be held in which
the suspected individual has at least seventy-two hours advance no-
tice.350 HRS must provide a list of actions it proposes to take and a
reason for each one, and the state must provide an attorney if the
individual is unable to afford one. At the hearing, the individual can-
not be identified by his or her real name,35 ' and has the right to at-
tend, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence.35 2 In issuing
a compulsory examination order, the court is authorized to order a
specific course of treatment and counseling if the disease is capable of
being rendered noncommunicable.3 53
However, the compulsory examination section is likely to have only
limited application to AIDS-related matters. Qualifying language
states that when a disease is incurable or cannot be treated in any way
except hospitalization, HRS must seek an isolation order, although it
may still request that a person be examined first.35 4 This proviso
strongly suggests that when HRS knows a person is infected with
HIV, which presently is incurable, it cannot request a compulsory ex-
amination order at all, but must request isolation.
3. Prehearing Detention
The Omnibus AIDS Act grants HRS a power it previously lacked:
the ability upon an ex parte court order to detain an individual prior
to an isolation or examination hearing. 55 However, this addition to
the law is extremely limited in scope. HRS must submit evidence to a
court that the individual actually is infected with a sexually transmissi-
ble disease, poses an immediate and substantial threat to the public,
evinces an intentional disregard for the health of others, and refuses
to act in a manner that will not place others at risk.
35 6
Additionally, HRS must show that the individual will leave the ju-
risdiction before a hearing could be held under either the isolation or
examination provisions and will continue to expose the public to the
risk of a sexually transmissible disease before the hearing can be
349. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.27(3) (Supp. 1988)).
350. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.27(4)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
351. Id. § 32, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2021 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.282 (Supp. 1988)).
352. Id. § 29, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2017 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.27(4) (Supp. 1988)).
353. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.27(6) (Supp. 1988)).
354. Id.
355. Id. § 31, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2019-21 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.281(1) (Supp. 1988)).
356. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 284.281(1)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1988)).
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held."' The court is forbidden to enter a pretrial detention order un-
less HRS has requested either an isolation or examination hearing and
is likely to prevail on the merits at that hearing, has shown that a
substantial danger to the public health will exist until the hearing date,
and that no other reasonable alternative exists to reduce the threat.
35 8
In keeping with its new "due process" policy, the Omnibus AIDS
Act added other procedural safeguards. Most importantly, the deten-
tion order itself is good for no longer than three days,359 the same
notice HRS must give in either an examination or isolation hearing.
Second, the individual who will be detained has a specific right to
bail, a bail hearing within twenty-four hours of detention, an attorney
to represent him or her at the hearing, and a right to present witnesses
and evidence and to cross-examine all witnesses. 6° Third, the individ-
ual must be identified pseudonymously in the proceedings and related




It is likely that the addition of new "due process" elements, espe-
cially the high standard of proof, will render the isolation provisions
constitutional. Both the Florida3 63 and United States3'6  Supreme
Courts have indicated that a standard of proof by clear and convinc-
ing evidence meets general constitutional requirements in analogous
proceedings. However, even if the isolation provisions are upheld,
they may produce other troubling constitutional questions.
One of the most important questions is whether the state will be
entitled, in subsequent or collateral criminal proceedings, to use any
information obtained during compulsory examination against the in-
dividual. The likely answer is that it will not. In the case of In re
Beverly,3 65 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that following a civil
commitment proceeding for incompetency, "any admissions, infor-
mation or evidence divulged by the person being examined" must be
357. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.281(1)(d)(2)-(3) (Supp. 1988)).
358. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.281(2) (Supp. 1988)).
359. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.281(6) (Supp. 1988)).
360. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.281(4) (Supp. 1988)).
361. Id. § 32, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2021 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.282 (Supp. 1988)).
362. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.281(5) (Supp. 1988)). This right, however, is guaran-
teed by the Florida Constitution and thus would exist with or without this provision. See FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 13.
363. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977).
364. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
365. 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977).
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excluded from related criminal proceedings. No reason appears why
the same requirement will not be enforced when the civil commitment
is in the nature of a quarantine.
Another question is whether the isolation statute itself is simply a
criminal sanction disguised as civil commitment. Under the isolation
statute, the state is proscribing conduct that necessarily will constitute
a knowing violation of other HIV-related criminal provisions.36 Yet
instead of being put to the protections surrounding a criminal trial,
such as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the
right to a jury trial, the state need only meet the lesser "clear and
convincing" standard before a judge. Since the conduct in question
usually can be considered criminal if the state wishes, a person facing
an isolation petition could argue that his or her right to due process,3 67
pretrial release upon reasonable terms,3 6 a jury trial,3 69 or prosecution
only upon the filing of a sworn information37 ° are being denied.
Nevertheless, the isolation statute conceivably falls within the
state's parens patriae power which allows it to confine individuals
who are under legal disabilities.3 7' The Supreme Court of Florida indi-
cated that under civil commitment statutes this power includes author-
ity to confine persons found to be dangerous to themselves or
others.3 72 Because the isolation statute could be interpreted not as a
penal statute, but as one providing for mandatory treatment and
counseling, the courts also may view it as falling within the state's
public health powers. For these reasons, it seems likely that the isola-
tion statute will be upheld, provided it is not administered in a penal
manner. 373
However, where the state's actions reveal a penal motive, and not a
desire to treat and counsel, the isolation and treatment provisions will
assume all the attributes of a criminal statute and should be regarded
366. See infra notes 378-97 and accompanying text. For a person to be apprehended under
the isolation provisions, the state must present evidence that the individual has engaged in be-
havior likely to transmit the virus despite counseling of the dangerousness of this activity to
others. Ch. 88-380, § 30, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2018 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.28(2)(b)
(Supp. 1988)). In most instances, this type of evidence will be sufficient to support probable
cause under one of the HIV-related criminal provisions. See infra notes 378-97 and accompany-
ing text.
367. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
368. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
369. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
370. Id. § 15.
371. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
372. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977).
373. This conclusion is consistent with dicta from the United States Supreme Court. See
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (sequestration may be justified for compulsory
treatment of one infected with venereal disease).
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as such. This would require the courts to declare the statute unconsti-
tutional as applied to the particular individual since the constitutional
rigors required of criminal proceedings cannot be met under this pro-
vision.
C. Quarantine of Places
One area of preexisting law concerning sexually transmissible dis-
eases that was left substantially unchanged in the 1986 Act deals with
quarantine of places.374 None of the due process safeguards added into
the Omnibus AIDS Act apply to quarantine orders since each by their
own terms apply only to the isolation of people.3 75 As a result, there is
only the preexisting requirement of proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence that (a) there is a significant amount of sexual activity occurring
in the place that is likely to transmit the sexually transmissible disease;
and (b) no other reasonable means of correcting the problem exists.176
However, because quarantine of places inevitably will involve prop-
erty interests, general due process requirements and the heavy burden
of proof placed on the state will dictate that HRS must provide notice
prior to the required hearing before a circuit court.3 77
V. CRIMINAL PROVISIONS
As part of the 1986 Act, the Legislature for the first time enacted a
statute specifically making it a criminal offense for an HIV-infected
person to engage in sexual intercourse with another person.3 78 The
statute had problems. For one thing, it failed to define the broad term
"sexual intercourse" and thus theoretically left open the possibility of
374. FLA. STAT. § 384.28 (1987).
375. See Ch. 88-380, § 30, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2018-19 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.28
(Supp. 1988)).
376. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 384.28(2) (Supp. 1988)). There has been no reported litiga-
tion in Florida involving the closure of adult establishments because of a belief that HIV was
being spread there. The issue has come up elsewhere, however. See Suburban Video, Inc. v. City
of Delafield, 694 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 693 F. Supp. 774
(D. Minn. 1988); Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); City of
New York v. New Saint Mark's Baths, 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct.), order
aff'd, 122 A.D.2d 747, 505 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Treants Enters., Inc. v.
Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360
S.E.2d 783 (1987).
377. For a discussion of the law applicable to this issue, see generally Rabin, The AIDS
Epidemic and Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 10 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & L.
729 (1986); Note, Preventing the Spread of AIDS by Restricting Sexual Conduct in Gay Bath-
houses: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 301 (1985). See also Note, Zon-
ing and the First Amendment: A Municipality's Power to Control Adult Use Establishments, 55
UMKC L. REV. 263 (1987).
378. FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1987).
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conviction for sexual acts unlikely to transmit HIV to another per-
son.3 79 Additionally, the statute only required an infected person to
inform his or her partner of the HIV infection-but it did not require
that the partner consent. 0 At least in theory, no crime would have
occurred under the 1986 Act if the defendant revealed the fact of HIV
infection and then raped the sexual partner.3
8
A. Failure to Notify Sexual Partners of HIV Infection
Newspaper articles brought to the forefront a controversy about
people deliberately spreading HIV.382 The 1988 Legislature responded
by revisiting the 1986 criminal sanction. However, it confined its revi-
sion of the 1986 Act to two minor adjustments: it updated the statute
to reflect the new international name given the AIDS virus (HIV), and
it added a consent requirement.3 3 Thus, a defendant no longer could
escape prosecution by informing the victim of his or her HIV infec-
tion prior to committing sexual battery. 384
The broad term "sexual intercourse" remained in the Omnibus
AIDS Act. As a result, it is still possible for a defendant to be prose-
cuted for sexual acts unlikely to transmit HIV. As noted by scientists,
one potential justification for this is that any sexual act with an in-
fected person carries some risk that HIV will be transmitted. 385 Under
this theory, the statute criminalizes exposing another person to this
risk without consent, which may be a valid state objective given the
state's broad health-related powers.
The problem with this theory is that if the sexual act was unlikely to
transmit HIV and otherwise was not a crime, then the statute actually
criminalizes the status of being HIV infected. Since status crimes gen-
erally are unconstitutional,3 86 the statute may be unenforceable to the
extent it criminalizes that status. The courts likely will be called upon
to determine whether the Legislature can criminalize exposing some-
one to a slight or moderate risk of becoming HIV infected.
B. Prostitution and Procuring
The Omnibus AIDS Act added an entirely new criminal sanction




382. E.g., Judge Ups Bail for Prostitute Linked to AIDS, Tampa Tribune, May 13, 1988, at
Bi, col. 4; Prostitute with AIDS Is Freed, Tallahassee Democrat, May 21, 1988, at B14, col. 1.
383. Ch. 88-380, § 27, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2016 (amending FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1987)).
384. Id.
385. MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 20-26.
386. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
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son committing an act of prostitution after testing positive for HIV
infection, who knows that he or she is infectious, could be found
guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor."s7 The sexual act must be of a
type likely to transmit HIV to others . 8 This offense is independent of
the crime of prostitution, which can be charged separately.
38 9
Recognizing that procurers of prostitutes also are a likely vector of
HIV, the Omnibus AIDS Act provided an equivalent penalty as a
first-degree misdemeanor3 90 for those who purchase the services of
prostitutes.3 9' The procurer must know of his or her HIV infection
and the likelihood of transmission to others. Like its counterpart, the
statute requires that the sexual act be of a kind likely to transmit the
infection. 39
2
C. Abolition of the "Year and a Day Rule"
One of the least discussed and potentially most far-reaching of the
AIDS-related criminal reforms of the 1988 session was the abolition
of the common law "year and a day rule. '393 Under this rule, a per-
son could not be prosecuted for any form of homicide if the victim
did not die within a year and a day of the injury.3 94 None of the legis-
lative history indicates that a conscious link was made between aboli-
tion of the rule and the prosection of AIDS-related crimes.
However, the abolition of the rule makes it easier for people in-
fected with HIV to be prosecuted for homicides or attempted homi-
cides. 395 By knowingly engaging in any act likely to transmit the virus,
the infected person may have committed a future murder. If by
chance the "victim" dies before the "assailant," the latter could be
prosecuted for homicide even if the death occurred some years re-
moved.
387. Ch. 88-380, § 44, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029 (amending FLA. STAT. § 796.08(4) (1987)).
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 760.08(6) (1987)).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Ch. 88-39, 1988 Fla. Laws 276, 276-77 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 782.035 (Supp. 1988)).
This provision took effect immediately upon being signed into law on May 18, 1988, and applies
to any injury inflicted on or after the effective date. Id. §§ 2-3, 1988 Fla. Laws at 277.
394. The rule originally came into Florida law as part of the common law of England, which
was adopted as the common law of Florida upon statehood in 1845. See Roberson v. State, 42
Fla. 212, 28 So. 427 (1900).
395. This possibility is suggested in Field & Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal Law, 15 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 46, 48 (1987).
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This reform is likely to be a fertile source of litigation as courts deal
with the vexing problem of causation.96 For instance, it may be possi-
ble to show that the "victim" actually was at risk for HIV infection
and may not have gotten the disease from the "assailant." The re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would render the
state's case impossible in such instances. Because of such problems,
homicide and attempted homicide charges should be reserved only for
the most serious and deliberate cases, such as injecting HIV-contami-
nated fluids into another person's bloodstream.
D. Knowingly Donating Infected Blood or Tissue
Responding to fears of infection in donated blood and human tis-
sue, the 1988 Legislature created another new criminal offense. This
provision makes it a third-degree felony to knowingly donate infected
blood or other human tissue after the donor has been informed that
he or she may communicate the disease to others. 397 It is likely that a
person charged under this section also could be charged with murder
or attempted murder based partly on the abrogation of the year and a
day rule.
VI. TESTING AND CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS
The 1988 Legislature enacted a broad series of new measures requir-
ing strict confidentiality for test results.3 9 These provisions, combined
with the nondiscrimination provisions, were designed to create an en-
vironment in which people with HIV-related disorders will not fear
reprisal if they take a test. 399 Indeed, the Omnibus AIDS Act prefaced
its testing and confidentiality provisions with a statement of legislative
intent indicating that "the public health will be served by facilitating
informed, voluntary, and confidential use of tests designed to detect
Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection. "4w
A. General History
Prior to 1988, Florida law contained only two testing and confiden-
tiality provisions specifically applicable to HIV infection. In 1985, the
396. For a general discussion of this problem, see id. at 48; Robinson, AIDS and the Crimi-
nal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 96-97
(1985).
397. Ch. 88-380, § 22, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2015 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(10)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
398. Id. § 21, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2008 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609 (Supp. 1988)).
399. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
400. Ch. 88-380, § 21, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2008 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(1) (Supp.
1988)).
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Legislature enacted a statute authorizing the establishment of confi-
dential alternative testing sites °1 The purpose was to encourage vol-
untary HIV testing by permitting people to remain anonymous. The
Legislature specified that all test results obtained at the alternative
sites would remain confidential, with any breach punishable as a first-
degree misdemeanor. 402 Moreover, any results of such tests could not
be used to determine suitability for employment or for insurance un-
derwriting .403
The second relevant portion of the 1986 Act specified confidential-




Specifically, they would be exempt from public disclosure laws and
not subject to subpoena except in certain narrow circumstances. These
exceptions include release by consent for emergencies to protect the
health or life of a named party, or in instances of child abuse.40 5 Fi-
nally, the 1986 Act prohibited the examination of any HRS employee
in any proceeding about the existence of records or other information
relating to persons examined or treated for sexually transmissible dis-
eases.406
B. Registration of Testing Services
In 1988, the Legislature extended the general principles of its prior
law to private parties who perform HIV-related tests. The first provi-
sion concerns the registration of private testing services. No person
can conduct or hold himself out as conducting an HIV testing service
without first being registered with HRS.
40 7
A long list of requirements precedes registration. A testing facility
must have a testing director with a minimum number of contact hours
in HIV-related matters, employ a licensed physician who supervises all
medical care, provide pretest counseling about the meaning of HIV
tests, corroborate all positive tests before confronting the patient with
the results, and provide personal post-test counseling by people with a
minimum level of training.48 During legislative hearings, legislators
401. FLA. STAT. § 381.606(2) (1987).
402. Id. § 381.606(4)(a).
403. Id. § 381.606(5).
404. Id. § 384.29.
405. Id. § 384.29.
406. Id. § 384.29(3).




emphasized the need for post-test counseling as one of the most im-
portant components of the registration requirements.4
C. Informed Consent
Testing facilities must obtain informed consent prior to administer-
ing an HIV test.410 Informed consent consists of an explanation of the
test's purposes, potential uses, limitations and meaning, followed by
either oral or written consent a.4 1 Where the consent is oral, there must
be documentation in the patient's medical record that the test was ex-
plained and consent obtained.
412
Although the Omnibus AIDS Act does not create a civil cause of
action for failure to obtain informed consent, it is likely that such a
cause can be inferred from it. Such a conclusion is reinforced by read-
ing the Omnibus AIDS Act in tandem with the Florida Medical Con-
sent Law (Consent Law) 413 and the common law of Florida.
Generally, performing a medical procedure without informed con-
sent can constitute assault, battery or negligence, and is actionable as
such. 414 However, the Consent Law bars recovery in tort for medical
procedures performed by a practitioner without adequate consent
where (1) some form of consent was obtained under accepted stan-
dards and a reasonable individual would have understood the proce-
dure, its alternatives and risks from the information actually
provided; or (2) the patient reasonably would have undergone the pro-
cedure had he or she been advised of the risks and alternatives. 415
The first of these exceptions may be interpreted as a "substantial
compliance" provision. Reading it together with the Omnibus AIDS
Act, it is likely that physicians who substantially comply with the in-
formed consent provision will be protected by the Consent Law. The
second of the Consent Law's exceptions, however, is unlikely to apply
in the context of HIV testing since it implies some sort of necessity for
the procedure. An HIV test is seldom necessary, even in many emer-
gency situations, since health care workers generally can protect them-
selves from HIV infection by assuming that every patient is infected.
As a result, the failure to obtain informed consent that substantially
409. E.g., Fla. S., Comm. on Commerce, transcript of hearing at 3 (May 26, 1988) (tran-
script on file, Florida State University Law Review) (testimony of Rep. Frankel).




413. FLA. STAT. § 768.46 (1987).
414. Brown v. Wood, 202 So. 2d 125, 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
415. FLA. STAT. § 768.46 (1987).
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complies with the terms of the Omnibus AIDS Act may subject the
person to an action in tort, even in an emergency situation.
416
D. Disclosing Test Results and Counseling
The Omnibus AIDS Act imposes on all testing facilities a duty of
confirming every positive test result before disclosing it to the pa-
tient. 417 Again, no civil cause of action is created for failure to do so,
but one may be inferred by the courts. This particularly may be true
where serious harm results, such as if the patient commits suicide. Un-
der such circumstances, an action for malpractice might be enter-
tained by the courts based on failure to follow the statutory procedure
and the foreseeability of the harm.
Similarly, the Omnibus AIDS Act imposes several specific require-
ments for post-test counseling that may be interpreted as a standard
of care in a malpractice claim. First, the counseling must be face-to-
face. Second, the counselor must disclose both the meaning of the test
and the need for additional testing. Third, the patient must be told of
measures to prevent transmission of HIV infection to others. Fourth,
the counselor must provide information on appropriate health care
services available in the area, including those for mental health. And
fifth, the patient must be told of the benefits of locating those people
he or she may have infected and the availability of state resources to
assist in this pursuit.418
E. Confidentiality
The Omnibus AIDS Act extends sweeping confidentiality protec-
tions to all information obtained from any HIV test performed in
Florida. 419 None of this information may be disclosed or compelled to
be disclosed, 420 and an intentional violation of confidentiality consti-
tutes a second-degree misdemeanor. 42 1 Additionally, it is likely that a
416. Representatives of the Florida Medical Association have argued to the contrary. AIDS-
Law Glitch Nullifies Consent Clause, Medical Leaders Say, Tallahassee Democrat, Aug. 1, 1988,
at IC, col. I. However, their arguments overlook the fact that the Consent Law does not bar
recovery for failure to obtain informed consent, but merely specifies two narrow instances in
which recovery will not be allowed. It thus seems likely that the courts will reject the Associa-
tion's interpretation.
417. Ch. 88-380, § 21, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2009 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(2)(d)
(Supp. 1988)).
418. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(2)(e) (Supp. 1988)).
419. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(2)(f) (Supp. 1988)).
420. Id.
421. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(5)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
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violation of confidentiality could create a civil cause of action predi-
cated on invasion of privacy.
422
The exceptions to confidentiality include release to the patient or an
authorized representative, and communication between health care
providers on a consulting basis. 423 A court order compelling the re-
lease of the records can be obtained if the person seeking the test re-
sults can show a compelling need that cannot be accommodated by
any other means. 424 In assessing "compelling need," the court must
weigh the need for disclosure against the privacy interests at stake and
the public interest in guaranteeing confidentiality as a means to en-
courage voluntary testing .425
In all court proceedings in which the release of test results is at is-
sue, pseudonyms must be substituted for the true names of the test
subjects. 426 The test subjects also must be afforded an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings, which must be in camera unless they
agree otherwise. 427 Whenever the court determines that test results
should be released, it must impose appropriate prohibitions of future
disclosure and attach a statement noting that further disclosure is a
violation of state law.
428
F. The Spousal Exception
The Omnibus AIDS Act recognizes one major exception to the
guarantee of confidentiality. A medical practitioner cannot be held
criminally or civilly liable for disclosing confidential information if (a)
a patient has tested positive for HIV infection and discloses the iden-
tity of a spouse; (b) the practitioner recommends that the patient no-
tify his or her spouse of the positive test and refrain from engaging in
behavior likely to transmit the virus, and the patient refuses; and (c)
"a perceived civil duty or the ethical guidelines of the profession"
422. See, e.g., Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Cape Publications, Inc.
v. Hitchner, 514 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
423. Ch. 88-380, § 21, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2008-10 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
381.609(2)(f)(3)-(4) (Supp. 1988)).
424. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(0(9) (Supp. 1988)).
425. Id. The Omnibus AIDS Act also provides that this balancing test "shall not apply to
blood bank donor records." While this creates a statutory exception to the exception, the Su-
preme Court of Florida's holding in Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Services, Inc., 500 So.
2d 533 (Fla. 1987), still appears to apply. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to
overrule Rasmussen, which essentially requires a balancing test in determining whether access to
blood bank records will be allowed. Id. at 537-38.
426. Ch. 88-380, § 21, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2010 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
381.609(2)(f)(9)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
427. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(2)(f)(9)(d) (Supp. 1988)).
428. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.609(2)(f)(9)(e) (Supp. 1988)).
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calls for the practitioner reasonably and in good faith to notify the
spouse.4 29 However, a practitioner cannot be held liable in a civil or
criminal context for failure to disclose HIV-related information to a
spouse. 430 Thus, in the context of AIDS cases, this provision attempts
to partially abrogate the duty to warn, recognized by Florida common
law.
4 3 1
These provisions raise several problems that may render them of
minimal value to practitioners. First, they do not specify what hap-
pens if the patient does not disclose the identity of the spouse, but the
practitioner learns this information elsewhere. Such a practitioner
would not fall within the immunity, although he or she still would be
under no obligation to disclose the information to the spouse. Second,
the Omnibus AIDS Act grants immunity only for warning a spouse-
not an extramarital lover. As a result, a significant number of people
who may be put at risk cannot be warned unless the practitioner is
willing to risk a lawsuit. 432 Third and most importantly, the Omnibus
AIDS Act specifies that in disclosing HIV-related information, the
practitioner must be acting under a "perceived" civil duty or accord-
ing to ethical guidelines. However, the very next provision states that
a practitioner never can be held liable for the failure to warn, and
seems to indicate that no civil duty or legally enforceable ethical obli-
gation ever can exist in Florida. It is possible that a practitioner still
might resort to statements contained in an ethical code of the profes-
sion, but this in itself would be problematic since many such codes
hold practitioners to a high standard of confidentiality.
Thus, the "shield provision" may do little more than create a de-
fense that can be raised if a physician is sued for disclosing HIV-re-
lated information to a spouse. A jury still may be called upon to
decide whether the practitioner actually acted upon a "perceived"
civil or ethical duty.
VII. DRUGS, HOME TESTS, AND THERAPIES FOR HIV INFECTION
In several straightforward provisions, the Omnibus AIDS Act and
related legislation deal with problems that may arise when drugs,
429. Id. § 43, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2027-28 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.2416 (Supp. 1988)).
430. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.2416(2) (Supp. 1988)). The term "practitioner" in-
cludes only those professionals regulated by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance. Id.
431. See Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), cert. denied, 245
So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971).
432. The legislative history indicates that legislators were concerned with the difficulty of
determining the identity of extramarital lovers and the potential liability that physicians might
incur in trying to do so. For instance, Representative Frankel stated: "I don't want us to be put
in-either doctors-or somebody in a judgment position. That type of-there's really a liability
problem there. And I think it's much easier to determine if someone is a spouse .... " Fla.
H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 31 (Feb. 29, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel).
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home tests and therapies are offered to the consumer for HIV-related
concerns. The Omnibus AIDS Act specifically prohibits the sale, de-
livery or advertisement of HIV home-testing433 or the advertisement of
any drug or device represented as having an effect on HIV infection
or its related illnesses and disorders. 434 Both of these provisions were
added to the Florida Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Although these provisions raise obvious first amendment problems,
nevertheless the courts may be willing to sustain them as a valid exer-
cise of police and health-related powers. Such a conclusion is bol-
stered by Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico,435 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
even truthful advertisement may be curtailed under some circum-
stances. Many advertisements related to HIV-related infections may
raise unjustified hopes among the infected, and almost certainly will
fall within the state's power to regulate untruthful commercial infor-
mation. Similarly, the ban on HIV home-testing kits most likely will
be sustained because of the possible unreliability of such tests and the
severe consequences that could be caused when a person receives a
positive test without adequate counseling.
In related legislation, 43 6 the Legislature approved a technical re-
drafting of Florida's investigational drug statute.43 7 Although not ex-
plicitly concerned with HIV, this statute may be of increasing
significance in years ahead as more experimental therapies are devel-
oped for HIV-related infections. Under the investigational drug stat-
ute, a person with appropriate scientific training can apply for
permission to use a new or experimental drug on a limited intrastate
basis even if it has not been approved for such use by the federal Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).4 1 The licensing process, established
by the Legislature in 1982, is supervised by the Pharmacy Program
Office of HRS in Tallahassee and administered by the Florida Drug
and Cosmetic Technical Review Panel439 appointed by the Secretary of
HRS.
433. Ch. 88-380, § 24, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2016 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 499.005(12)
(Supp. 1988)). This prohibition on home test kits is not supported by some scientific authority.
The National Institute of Sciences, for instance, has recommended that so long as accuracy can
be ensured, home test kits might encourage some people to be tested who otherwise would not.
AIDS UPDATE 1988, supra note 3, at 79-80.
434. Ch. 88-380, § 25, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2016 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 499.0054(6)(dd)
(Supp. 1988)).
435. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
436. Fla. CS for SB 212 (1988).
437. Ch. 88-159, § 3, 1988 Fla. Laws 861, 863 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 499.003 (Supp.
1988)).
438. The statute is implemented by FLA. ADBIN. CODE R. 1OD-45.0375 (1986).
439. FLA. STAT. § 499.02 (1987).
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The technical rewrite of the statute left the investigational drug stat-
ute substantially unchanged. It remains similar to a California stat-
ute, 440 which has been used to provide AIDS patients with drugs or
particular therapies not yet approved by the FDA. However, it should
be noted that the FDA's authority to intervene in this area remains
substantial, since it is empowered to regulate any drugs involved in
interstate commerce.
VIII. HIV IN PRISONS AND JAILS
Generally eschewing mandatory testing as a method of controlling
HIV, the Omnibus AIDS Act nevertheless incorporated two provi-
sions that permit mandatory testing in some limited circumstances.
Both apply exclusively to inmates in state or local facilities. 44 1 The
Omnibus AIDS Act also specifically provides the Department of Cor-
rections (DOC) authority to adopt policies for segregating infected in-
mates.
The first of the mandatory testing provisions allows DOC, pursuant
to guidelines recognized by the CDC and recommendations of the
Correctional Medical Authority, to test any inmate who has engaged
in any behavior placing him or her at "high risk." 442 Such behavior
will include sexual contact with another person, an altercation involv-
ing exposure to bodily fluids, the use of intravenous drugs, tattooing
and any other activity medically known to transmit the virus. 443 The
results of the test become a part of the inmate's medical file, accessi-
ble only according to agency rule.4"
The second of the mandatory testing provisions authorizes city and
county jails to adopt their own mandatory testing policies." 5 Such
policies must be developed in consultation with the facility's medical
provider and must be consistent with CDC and Correctional Medical
Authority guidelines." 6 There is no requirement that the inmate must
have engaged in a high-risk behavior, although local facilities are free
to adopt such a requirement on their own.447 The Omnibus AIDS Act
440. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 26678-26679.5 (Deering Supp. 1988). Texas
apparently permits a similar licensing. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-14(4)(b)(3) (Ver-
non Supp. 1988).
441. Prior to the Omnibus AIDS Act, only HRS was explicitly authorized to test inmates.
See FLA. STAT. § 384.32(1) (1987).
442. Ch. 88-380, § 12, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2003 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 945.35(3) (Supp.
1988)).
443. Id.
444. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 945.35(4) (Supp. 1988)).




specifies that information obtained from these tests will be confiden-
tial, exempt from the public records disclosure laws and may not be
disclosed to unauthorized people."8
An obvious problem posed by these mandatory testing provisions is
whether they authorize unlawful searches. At least one court has
found that a mandatory testing policy applied to state health
workers" 9 violated the fourth amendment. However, this Nebraska
case probably is inapposite because it did not involve inmates and was
not applied specifically to people known to have engaged in high-risk
behavior. The special risks of prison life and the potential liability to
inmates who are negligently or recklessly exposed to HIV may justify
limited mandatory testing policies.
The Omnibus AIDS Act authorizes DOC to adopt policies for seg-
regating HIV-infected inmates.4 50 Those policies may include matters
relating to housing, physical contact, dining, recreation and exercise
hours or locations.4 1 However, any policies must be consistent with
the guidelines of the CDC and the Correctional Medical Authority.
45 2
IX. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
Potentially the most important policy-related provisions of the Om-
nibus AIDS Act are those establishing a massive new statewide educa-
tion program. These include authorization for HRS to establish
general educational programs aimed at the public, including high risk
groups; 453 mandatory continuing education programs for certain li-
censed professions; 45 4 annual educational handouts to all state work-
ers; 455 new educational standards for law enforcement officers; 45 6
inmate education; 457 required high school instruction on HIV; 458 au-
448. Id.
449. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb.
1988).




453. Id. § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1998 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.608 (Supp. 1988)).
454. Id. § 3, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1999 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.041 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 4,
1988 Fla. Laws at 2000 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.2226 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 5, 1988 Fla. Laws
at 2001 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.227(1)(g) (Supp. 1988)); id. § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1943
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.44 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2001-02 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 455.2227 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 8, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2002 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
381.043 (Supp. 1988)).
455. Id. § 10, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2002 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 110.1125 (Supp. 1988)).
456. Id. § 11, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2002 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.172 (Supp. 1988)).
457. Id. § 12, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2002-03 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 945.35 (Supp. 1988)).
458. Id. § 14, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2004-05 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 232.246 (Supp. 1988)).
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thorization for other educational programs in any grade-level, pro-
vided sexual abstinence is taught as a standard of behavior; 459 and
mandatory college-level orientation programs on HIV infection and
discussion of the subject in college and university handbooks.4
The legislative history indicates that education is a centerpiece of
the Omnibus AIDS Act, since prevention is currently the best method
of fighting the disease. 461 However, these provisions were substantially
diluted in dickering between House and Senate in the final days of the
session. The House wanted to mandate educational programs in virtu-
ally every regulated profession, while the Senate wanted to require
such programs only among health care professionals. The final com-
promise generally was derived from the early Senate position. 61
X. DONATION OF BLOOD AND TISSUE
Perhaps no industry has been so significantly and seriously hurt by
the HIV epidemic as blood and human tissue banks. From the earliest
days of the epidemic, it became apparent to scientists that the then-
unknown agent causing AIDS probably was blood-borne, like hepati-
tis B.46 This theory proved to be tragically correct, with more than
1,500 cases of transfusion-related AIDS reported in the United
States./ 4 While routine screening quickly was adopted as an industry
standard after the development of the ELISA test,45 such testing had
not been mandated by Florida law prior to the 1988 legislative session.
Nor had Florida imposed any standards relating to informed consent,
counseling and other procedures associated with donations. The Om-
nibus AIDS Act for the first time imposed such standards .
6 6
A. Informed Consent
All donated blood and tissue must be tested prior to use in humans,
but the donor must execute a written informed consent. 6 7 The consent
459. Id. § 15, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2005 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 233.0672 (Supp. 1988)).
460. Id. § 18, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2007 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 240.2097 (Supp. 1988)); id. §
19, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2007-08 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 240.3191 (Supp. 1988)); id. § 20, 1988
Fla. Laws at 2008 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 240.3192 (Supp. 1988)).
461. E.g., Fla. H.R., transcript of proceedings at 3-4 (May 10, 1988) (transcript on file,
Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel); Fla. H.R., Comm. on
Health Care, transcript of hearing at 4-5 (Apr. 13, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida State Uni-
versity Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel).
462. Because of space considerations, this Article will not discuss in detail the educational
provisions.
463. AIDS UPDATE 1988, supra note 3, at 33.
464. Id. at 34.
465. Id.
466. Ch. 88-380, § 22, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2013 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105 (Supp.
1988)).
467. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(1) (Supp. 1988)).
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must include a fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, the
meaning of any test results and a description of the confidential na-
ture of the results. If the person refuses consent, he or she may not be
accepted as a donor.
468
There are two exceptions. First, written informed consent is not re-
quired where the blood or tissue is received "from an out-of-state
blood bank." 469 The Omnibus AIDS Act does not specify what is to
occur if the facility sending the blood or tissue actually is not a blood
bank but some other health care facility. Presumably, the exemption
extends to any facility sending into Florida "blood, plasma, organ[s],
skin, or other human tissue, ' 470 since these are the items specified in
the Omnibus AIDS Act itself. Second, written informed consent need
not be obtained where the blood or tissue is referred by another health
care provider or facility for testing.47 1 In those circumstances, the one
making the referral would be obligated to obtain informed consent.
B. Testing and Disinfection Procedures
The Omnibus AIDS Act further provides that "[n]o person shall
collect any blood, organ, skin, or other human tissue from one human
being and hold it for, or actually perform, any implantation, trans-
plantation, transfusion, grafting, or any other method of transfer to
another human being" without doing one of two things. 472 The person
must either perform a test to determine whether HIV and other com-
municable diseases specified by HRS rule are present, or the person
must perform any procedure approved by HRS for destroying infec-
tious agents that might be present in the blood or tissue. 473
One exception to the testing procedures is provided for cases of
emergency. Transplants, implants, or transfusions of human tissue,
can occur without testing provided the recipient has given informed
consent. 474 Although this exception is silent on disinfection proce-
dures, a separate provision states that blood or tissue that is known to
be infected can be used in a lifesaving procedure with the recipient's
informed consent. 475 Thus, it seems likely that a court would construe
these provisions in pari materia to mean that disinfection procedures
need not be conducted if the recipient waives them after informed
468. Id.
469. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(2) (Supp. 1988)).
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(3) (Supp. 1988)).
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(4)(2) (Supp. 1988)).
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consent. In any event, this provision will have no application to HIV-
infected blood or tissue unless and until a disinfecting procedure is
developed.
As for the disposal of infected blood and tissue, the Omnibus AIDS
Act authorizes HRS to develop agency rules governing proper disposal
procedures. 476 Blood or tissue must be rendered noncommunicable or
destroyed. 477 The only exceptions are where the blood or tissue are
labeled as HIV-infected and are used for research or in a lifesaving
medical procedure after the recipient gives informed consent. 478 Viola-
tion of any of these testing requirements is a misdemeanor of the first
degree. 4
79
C. Informing Seropositive Donors
When blood or tissue tests positive for HIV infection, the testing
facility must inform the donor. 40 Notice of abnormal test results must
be sent to the donor by certified mail, and must offer to discuss the
nature and significance of the result either in person or by phone. 48' If
the donor fails to respond within thirty days, the facility may send the
actual test results along with other required information to the donor,
by certified mail.
482
Whether communicating in person or in writing, the facility must
provide the following specific information: (1) the meaning of the test
results; (2) measures for preventing HIV transmission; (3) the availa-
bility of local health, mental health and social support services; (4) the
benefits of locating and counseling people whom the donor may have
infected; and (5) the availability of services to help locate such peo-
ple. 483 The facility must hold test results under strict confidence, as
provided in the testing and confidentiality provisions of the Omnibus
AIDS Act.
484
XI. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND PLANNING
As the first step in an effort to come to grips with the extent of HIV
infection in Florida, the Omnibus AIDS Act authorizes HRS to begin
476. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(4) (Supp. 1988)).
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(10)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
480. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(5) (Supp. 1988)).
481. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(6)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
482. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(6)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
483. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(5) (Supp. 1988)).
484. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.6105(8) (Supp. 1988)).
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an extensive epidemiological study45 and by July 1, 1989, to begin
requiring that cases of HIV infection be reported in a way that will
not identify the infected people. 8 6 The Legislature provided that any
studies may not duplicate other national studies and must be designed
to provide insight into Florida's experience with HIV. 487 Emphasis
must be placed on practical applications and disease control.
48
The Omnibus AIDS Act specifically authorizes local health councils
and the Statewide Health Council to study the HIV epidemic and par-
ticipate in determining methods of controlling it;489 and it requires the
Social Services Estimating Conference to begin estimating the poten-
tial economic impact AIDS will have on total state health expendi-
tures.490
XII. PATIENT CARE NETWORKS
To increase local support services available to people with HIV-re-
lated diseases, the Legislature authorized HRS to establish local "Pa-
tient Care Networks" wherever the numbers of AIDS patients are
sufficient. 49' The Department is given rulemaking authority to set up
the networks, taking into account "natural trade areas and centers of
medical excellence that specialize in" AIDS treatment.4 92 Each net-
work must include representation by people infected with HIV, health
care providers, business interests, HRS and local governments.
4 93
Once each year, beginning in April 1989, each network must report to
HRS its recommendations for patient care.
494
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
It is a curious characteristic of the AIDS epidemic that it renders
inadequate the most comfortable of notions, legal doctrines being no
exception. Florida's quarantine statutes, for instance, might never
have been reexamined had HIV infection not appeared in this coun-
485. Id. § 23, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2015 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.614 (Supp. 1988)).
486. Id. § 28, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2016-17 (amending FLA. STAT. § 384.25(2) (1987)). This
authorization is permissive, not mandatory. Id. Under prior law, reporting rules were limited to
"physician reporting" of AIDS and ARC cases. See FLA. STAT. § 384.25(2) (1987).
487. Ch. 88-380, § 23, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2015 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.614(1) (Supp.
1988)).
488. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 381.614(2) (Supp. 1988)).
489. Id. § 40, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2023 (amending FLA. STAT. § 381.703 (1987)).
490. Id. § 41, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2027.
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try.495 Nor is it likely that the state seriously would have considered
cloaking all information about a particular disease with strict guaran-
tees of confidentiality. Certainly no one seriously would have consid-
ered providing special statutory civil rights to people infected by the
influenza and polio epidemics earlier in this century. Yet AIDS itself
is something quite different from anything ever experienced by Ameri-
can society or jurisprudence.
While this nation has encountered incurable diseases before, it has
never experienced one that at first appeared exclusively among minori-
ties perceived as living beyond the limits of respectability. 496 This, per-
haps, is the single factor that has made AIDS such a troubling
problem. Society's own best and cherished moral scruples may have
blinded a large number of people to the wholesale tragedy that now
looms.
Certainly the temptation was there, and frequently was indulged by
prominent people,4 97 to regard AIDS as something that was deserved
by those who contracted it-something that arose from immorality, a
contagion that usually did not strike "innocents. ' 491 If illness can be a
metaphor, as Susan Sontag has argued, 499 then AIDS to many people
was the stigmatic symbol of lifestyles found to be distasteful.5s° In ret-
rospect, AIDS was not the reason for a new hatred; it was an excuse
for one that already existed.
Yet the comfortable notion that AIDS will leave alone the main-
stream of society has proven horribly wrong. This is not merely to say
495. The fact that the 1988 Legislature officially removed the word "quarantine" from the
Sexually Transmissible Disease Act shows squeamishness over the concept. At one point in a
committee hearing, Gary Clarke of HRS consistently referred to the concept as "the 'Q' word."
Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of proceedings at 61-65 (Apr. 7, 1988) (transcript
on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Gary Clarke). Indeed, "quarantine"
as it will be applied to HIV carriers is not quarantine in the classical sense at all, since it will not
be applied to all infected people but only those who engage in dangerous behavior. Thus the new
quarantine statute is more akin to civil commitment or criminal sanctions than to quarantine.
496. See Banks & McFadden, Rush to Judgment: HIV Test Reliability and Screening, 23
TULSA L.J. 1, 1-2 nn.1 & 4 (1987) (discussing moral indignation toward gay people). There are
parallels, however, between AIDS and the incidence of syphilis during the Victorian era. See
AIDS UPDATE 1988, supra note 3, at 27-29. Nevertheless, the National Academy of Sciences
concedes that the social vulnerability of early high-risk groups "entails unique considerations for
public health officials." Id. at 61.
497. See Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH
CARE 231, 235 (1986) (recounting several such statements).
498. See id.
499. S. SONTAG, ILLNESS As METAPHOR (1978).
500. See Eisenberg, The Genesis of Fear: AIDS and the Public's Response to Science, 14
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 243, 245 (1986) (discussing the symbolic significance of AIDS and
the fear it engenders); Dolgin, AIDS: Social Meanings and Legal Ramifications, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 193, 195-202 (1985) (discussing social symbolism of AIDS).
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that the disease will spread beyond its initial minority victims, which it
is doing already.5 0' It is also to say that fate of minorities, even de-
spised ones, is a crucial factor in the overall health of a society. Flori-
da's Legislature estimates that between two and four percent of the
state's current population is infected with HIV-as many as 400,000
people. As many as 200,000 of these may die by the 1990s,102 requiring
astronomical expenditures by the state. State officials believe that one
in nine of all male Floridiang between the ages of 30 and 39 currently
are infected with the virus. 03 One legislator grimly predicted that in
the next decade, a major part of this state's health resources will be
devoted to opening and maintaining a huge network of state AIDS
hospitals.1°4
Anyone who believes that so much illness and death can occur with-
out disrupting everything of value in society is macabrely mistaken. It
does not matter who the victims are or how they acquired the disease;
the death and the suffering still will rob Florida of resources, deprive
it of productive workers, eliminate tax revenues, obliterate some of its
most creative minds, 505 and force a reappraisal of the way government
is operated. To separate people with AIDS into groups of "inno-
cents" and those who are not does little but reveal an incredible igno-
rance of what is upon us all, since everyone will be diminished by
what will happen if AIDS is not eradicated. °6
Faced with a disease such as this, a hard hit society like Florida's
really only has two choices. It can eschew its constitutional heritage,
drastically curtail its civil liberties, institute mandatory testing and at-
tempt to segregate infected people from the rest of society. Or it can
offer to accept those people, extend civil protections to them, make
sure they can provide for themselves, and create an atmosphere in
which the stigma attached to AIDS no longer exists, at least in a legal
sense.
501. For a general discussion and prediction of the spread of HIV into mainstream groups,
see MASTERS & JOHNsON, supra note 1. See also Graham, AIDS Now Menaces Everyone, Talla-
hassee Democrat, July 12, 1988, at 7A, col. 1.
502. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
503. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 12 (Apr. 13, 1988) (tran-
script on file, Florida State University Law Review) (comments of Rep. Frankel).
504. Id. at 15 (Apr. 13, 1988) (comments of Rep. Gordon); id. at 34 (Apr. 28, 1988) (com-
ments of Rep. Gordon). See also id. at 6 (Apr. 7, 1988) (comments of Rep. Gordon).
505. See The Face of AIDS, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 10, 1987, at 22-23.
506. The Presidential Commission studying the HIV epidemic placed on the frontispiece of
its report the famous quotation of John Donne:
No man is an Iland, intire of itselfe ...
Any man's death diminishes me,
because I am involved in Mankinde.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at iv.
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For the former option, the cost would be bankrupting, and not
merely in terms of the loss of a two century tradition of civil liberties.
Providing a single ELISA test for Floridians would cost as much as
$132 million, 07 and generally it is conceded that retesting is necessary
at frequent intervals 0 Likewise, housing as many as 400,000 infected
people in state quarantine camps simply is not fiscally possible.
As a society of limited resources, Florida really only has one choice.
And it is the choice generally approved by the 1988 Legislature when
it adopted the Omnibus AIDS Act. With all its deficiencies and impre-
cise language, it constitutes one of the most responsible pieces of legis-
lation yet produced in Florida. Legislators who felt qualms about
voting for the bill nevertheless indicated that its unprecedented non-
discrimination and confidentiality provisions were the best hope
Florida has in fighting the spread of HIV,5°9 a conclusion also reached
by the Reagan administration's Presidential Commission on the Hu-
man Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic °10 Logic itself dictates the
same conclusion.
If fear and distrust prevail, AIDS cannot be stopped. Those in-
fected will be driven into a secretive existence, and the disease along
with them. Eradication of the virus will be impossible because few will
be frank about their infection if doing so means losing whatever lib-
erty and property HIV has not yet taken from them. Thus, the ques-
tion AIDS poses to this and every other state is whether our society
can comprehend that the harm suffered by minorities, even despised
ones, is harm to society itself. This disease, if it is properly a meta-
phor for anything, embodies the irrational fear and hatred that have
allowed it to spread unchecked simply because its initial victim's life-
styles were distasteful to some.5 1'
507. The cost of a single ELISA test in May 1988 was estimated at $11, with the confirma-
tory Western Blot test costing $30.80. Letter from Paula Tully, Public Information Specialist,
Fla. Dep't. of Corr., to R.C. Waters (May 19, 1988) (discussing cost of HIV testing to state
agencies) (transcript on file, Florida State University Law Review).
508. The CDC recommends rescreening every six weeks. Id.
509. Fla. H.R., transcript of proceedings at 12-14 (May 11, 1988) (transcript on file, Florida
State University Law Review) (comments of Reps. Thomas Drage, Jr., Repub., Orlando, and
Javier Souto, Repub., Miami).
510. PRESIDENTIAL CoMassoIN REPORT, supra note 3, at 119-31.
511. For a detailed journalistic treatment of this phenomenon, see R. SHiLTS, AND THE BAND
PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPmEmic (1987). See also Nickens, AIDS, Race,
and the Law: The Social Construction of Disease, 12 NOVA L. REv. 1179, 1186-88 (1988) (gener-
ally concluding that the disease was allowed to spread unchecked because of the dislike of the
minority communities in which it first appeared); Schram, AIDS Prevention-Too Little, Too
Late, 12 NOVA L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1988) (concluding that the early perception of AIDS as a
"gay disease" led to "tremendous reluctance to fund prevention programs").
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It is time to realize, as the Omnibus AIDS Act implicitly does, that
this attitude is more deadly than the virus itself. In such an environ-
ment the virus can do nothing but thrive. When future Legislatures
address the legal problems caused by AIDS, as they inevitably must,
the philosophy underlying the Omnibus AIDS Act should serve as the
starting point of every debate and every proposal. In the -last analysis,
it is the only rational choice.
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STATE OF FLORIDA
Florida Commission on Human Relations
FCHR No. 85-0624
MR. TODD F. SHUTTLEWORTH
Complainant
c/o Larry Corman, Esquire
2310 One Financial Plaza
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394
BROWARD COUNTY OFFICE OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT POLICY
Respondent
Janet Lander, Assistant General Counsel
115 South Andrews Avenue, Suite 423
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
DETERMINATION: CAUSE
MR. TODD F. SHUTTLEWORTH filed a Complaint of Discrimi-
nation alleging that BROWARD COUNTY OFFICE OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT POLICY discriminated against him on the
basis of his handicap (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) in viola-
tion of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, Sections 760.01-
760.10, Florida Statutes (1983).' An investigation of this matter has
been conducted and shows the following:
1. Complainant is a person within the meaning of Section
760.02(5), Florida Statutes.
2. Complainant is an individual within the meaning of Section
760.10(1), Florida Statutes, by reason of his medical condition. Com-
plainant's medical condition, acquired immune deficiency syndrome,
falls within this Commission's interpretation of the term "handicap".
See, e.g., Fenesy v. GTE Data Services, Inc., FCHR Case No. 79-214,
DOAH Case No. 80-473, FCHR Order No. 81-0442, 3 FALR 1764-A
(FCHR August 11, 1981), which held:
Since this statute does not indicate a different connotation, the term
"handicap" should be given a meaning accorded by common usage.




See, Gaulden v. Kirk, 47 So.2d. 567 (Fla. 1950). In construing
similar statutes, courts of three other states have resorted to the
definition of "handicap" contained in Webster's Third International
Dictionary. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Washington State Human Rights Commission, 577 P.2d 307
(Wash. 1976), State v. Turner, 209 N.E. 2d 475 (Ohio 1965),
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad v. Department of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 215 N.W. 2d 443 (Wis.
1974). Generally "handicap" connotes a condition that prevents
normal functioning in some way: "A person with a handicap does
not enjoy, in some manner, the full and normal use of his sensory,
mental or physical faculties." Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Washington State Human Relations
Commission, supra.
Based upon the plain meaning of the term "handicap" and the medi-
cal evidence presented, an individual with acquired immune deficiency
syndrome is within the coverage of the Human Rights Act of 1977 in
that such individual "does not enjoy, in some manner, the full and
normal use of his sensory, mental or physical faculties." Accord Ar-
line v. School Board of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir.
1985), which held that an individual with a chronic contagious dis-
ease, tuberculosis, is within the coverage of Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973.
3. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section
760.02(6), Florida Statutes.
4. The Complaint of Discrimination was timely filed. Section
760.10, Fla. Stat.; Rule 22T-9.01(2).
5.. On September 13, 1984, Complainant was terminated from his
position of Administrative and Management Intern. He was initially
employed by Respondent on May 16, 1983. It is undisputed that Com-
plainant's work performance was satisfactory or above during this
employment.
6. Respondent's articulated reason for discharging Complainant
was because he contracted acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS). The action was taken "due to a lack of knowledge as to the
severity and communicable aspect of the disease in consideration of
protecting the Complainant, other county employees and the public."
7. In defense of its articulated reason, Respondent asserts that it
cannot screen all persons who may come into contact with Complain-
ant in the course of his employment. Respondent asserts that it cannot
assume the risk of allowing even one person to unwittingly contract
AIDS because of Complainant's presence at the work site.
8. Respondent based this statement in substantial part on an article
entitled AIDS-Information and Procedural Guidelines for Providing
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Health and Social Services to Persons with AIDS (HRS July 1984). It
provides in pertinent part that while the consensus of the medical
community holds that intimate, as opposed to casual, contact is the
key to transmission of AIDS, the following persons are known to be
in a high risk category and should avoid any exposure to AIDS pa-
tients: persons receiving large-dose steroid drugs on a daily basis; per-
sons with known immune deficiency diseases; persons receiving
chemotherapy who have not achieved hematologic recovery; persons
receiving any immunosuppressive medication; and persons who are
pregnant.
9. The risk cited above, however, does not emanate from all indi-
viduals with AIDS but only from those individuals with easily trans-
missible opportunistic infections.
10. Respondent has not shown that Complainant had an easily
transmissible opportunistic infection when it made the decision to ter-
minate Complainant's employment.
11. In addition, Complainant worked in a private office which was
enclosed by a floor to ceiling wall on one side and by five feet high
partitions on the other three sides.
12. State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Serv-
ices (HRS) advises in its recommended procedures for outpatients that
AIDS outpatients may use common waiting areas and bathroom facil-
ities.
13. HRS recommends that its employees who have AIDS and are
directly involved in patient care be transferred to non-patient care po-
sitions or be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
the employees are free from transmissible infections and are not un-
duly susceptible to infections so that the employees might be retained
in a patient care position.
14. Section 760.10, 'Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:
"(1) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(a) To discharge ... any individual ... because of such
individual's.., handicap....
(8) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, it is not an
unlawful employment practice under ss. 760.01 - 760.10 for an
employer.., to:
(a) Take or fail to take any action on the basis of ... handicap ...
in those certain instances in which . . . absence of a particular
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handicap . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary for the performance of the particular employment to which
such action or inaction is related.
15. The Florida courts in interpreting the term "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" have held that the defense of risk of future in-
jury must be substantial. School Board of Pinellas County v. Rateau,
449 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Similarly, this Commission has
held that the evidence must support a conclusion that the employer
had a reasonable basis for its assessment of the risk of injury or death
to establish the bona fide occupational qualification. Hatfield v. H &
D Packaging, Inc., FCHR Case No. 81-0870, FCHR Order No. 82-
022, 4 FALR 1110-A (April 18, 1982). Accord Mantolete v. Bolger,
767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
16. Respondent failed to show that there was a substantial risk of
future injury or a reasonable basis for its assessment of the risk of
injury to Complainant, other employees or the public by retaining
Complainant in its employ.
17. I am mindful of the serious and important concerns of the em-
ployer, the other employees and the public. Based upon my review of
this case, I do not find that Respondent was acting in bad faith when
it made the decision to terminate Complainant; nevertheless, there is
an absence of evidence to show with any reasonable probability that
AIDS can be transmitted by casual contact that commonly occurs in
the workplace.
Pursuant to the authority delegated to me by Rules 22T-6.04(2)(e)
and 22T-9.02, it is my determination that there is reasonable cause to
believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred in that:
A. Complainant has shown a prima facie violation of the Human
Rights Act of 1977, as amended; and
B. Respondent has articulated, but failed to substantiate, legitimate,
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2. In so holding, I specifically refrain from resolving issues involving employment deci-
sions to reassign or alter the working conditions of employees with AIDS or decisions involving
employees with transmissible infections.
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